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Abstract 
The comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of the Republic of Sudan and 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, ended Africa’s longest running civil war and 
enabled the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan to initiate a process of state 
formation and political order in Southern Sudan. 
   
This thesis aims to understand how sovereignty was crafted in Southern Sudan, by 
investigating the emergence of the Government of Southern Sudan. It is assumed that this 
development relies on some fundamental practices of statecraft, namely: the provision of 
security, administration of justice, revenue capture and political processes and institutions. 
These four dimensions are the basis of the analysis of how sovereignty is crafted in Southern 
Sudan. 
 
It argues that some aspects of traditional theories on the state and sovereignty can be 
transferred to this context. However, these theories lack some aspects that makes 
implementation of practices of statecraft unfulfilled in South Sudan. 
 
My findings shows that there has been progress in all the four dimensions, yet there is a gap 
between established institutions and implementation of policy. Nevertheless, the Republic of 
South Sudan was proclaimed 9 July 2011. 
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1. Introduction 
Sovereignty is an embedded and fundamental principle in the western world. It is regarded as 
a defining principle of international relations, establishing the formal criteria for membership 
in the international system. It reflects the ultimate political authority, where the state is not 
subjected to a higher power as regards the making and enforcing of political decisions (Buzan 
2003). In the context of international relations it indicates that states claim full self-
government and mutual recognition between states of this claim of sovereignty. It is 
promulgated in international law through the UN charter. 
However, this does not necessarily reflect sovereignty in the African context. The African 
state has been given many names. Scholars looking into the African state has used labels as: 
quasi-state, weak, failed, neo-patrimonial and more. This is because the African context has 
produced a state that varies from the definition of the state in the western context. In the same 
way, sovereignty is also argued to have a different status on the African continent. The 
heritage from the colonial area has given precedence of labeling African sovereignty as 
juridical sovereignty. Defined by its legality rather than effectiveness.  
When the colonial powers left the African continent, the also left behind demarcations of 
borders that still today stand strong. Country names have changed as well as the powers in 
charge, but the borders are left pretty much unchanged. Nevertheless, there have been some 
instances where a demarcation has been challenged. “Throughout the African continent, there 
are several specific sites and processes of contested or attempted sovereignty – what we call 
‘sovereignty in the making’”1. One very interesting case of attempted sovereignty is the 
creation of an independent South Sudan. 
1.1 Southern Sudan, secession and sovereignty - 
from Southern to South Sudan? 
By the summer of 2011, Southern Sudan will become an independent state. This puts 
Southern Sudan in a remarkable situation in the African context. There are few examples of 
secessions or changes of the borders left by the colonialists. The outbreak of the first civil war 
between the northern and southern region of Sudan, came after the independence from Anglo-
                                                
1 Sovereignty in the making project draft, Fafo AIS. 
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Egyptian rule in 1956 (Johnson 2003: 21). After a short cease of fire, after the signing of the 
Addis Ababa agreement in the 1970’s, the conflict erupted yet again in the beginning of the 
1980’s (Johnson 2003: 39). The second civil war lasted until the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Far from being the only conflict in the 
region, it has been claimed that it was the longest running civil war on the African continent, 
which has been of great influence towards the claim of self-determination for the people in 
Southern Sudan.  
The legitimacy of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) rests on the agreements of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, between the Government of the Republic of the 
Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The agreement 
lay out the guiding principles for a 6 yearlong interim period. It holds the right to self-
determination for the people of South Sudan with the 2011 referendum for unity or secession2. 
Even thought unity was emphasized in the agreement, the referendum showed a 98 % claim 
for secession. As of July this year South Sudan can become a sovereign state. 
1.2 Scope and research question 
However, sovereignty as we know it holds certain implications. Are these present in this new 
state? To investigate that, I will ask the questions: what is being done in South Sudan to craft 
sovereignty? And what are the main challenges? This study will concentrate on four 
important dimensions in relation to sovereignty: security provision; administration of justice; 
revenue capture; and political processes and institution. These are chosen because they 
represent activities that are integral and constitutive of sovereignty3. Under these dimensions I 
will look into the most important observable processes in the case of building sovereignty in 
Southern Sudan. At the same time, it will be important to keep in mind that theories on 
sovereignty mainly derives from the Western European context. Not all theories developed in 
a European context are applicable when looking into Africa. In a following chapter, I will 
further explain what I have named the problem of transferability. 
                                                
2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 09.01.2005, http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515. 
3 Sovereignty in the making project draft, Fafo AIS. 
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1.2.1 Narrowing down the scope 
Geographically, the paper will concentrate exclusively on the Southern part of Sudan, soon to 
be the Republic of South Sudan. This empirical delimitation in the paper is due to the scope 
and to be able to follow the problematic I sat out to answer. A more detailed explanation will 
be presented in the methodology chapter. The names Southern Sudan and South Sudan will be 
used interchangeably. When I started researching the subject no one really knew if the 
Republic of South Sudan would become reality, yet by the summer of 2011 they declared 
their independence. As a consequence, Southern Sudan is used mainly to refer to the time 
period before 9th July 2011.    
In the scope of time, the analysis is limited to concentrate on the period from the signing of 
the CPA in 2005 until the secession date of July 2011. This period have seen the change from 
civil war towards the development of a Southern Sudanese government. It is likely that most 
interesting aspects related to the developments in the four chosen variables are to be found in 
this period of time. A further explanation on the scope of time can be found in section 2.5 
were I will further develop dimensions and indicators. 
The theoretical scope of this paper is not yet given, and will be fully explored in the 
theoretical approach chapter. This paper is parts of a larger project with the goal to further 
develop theories on sovereignty in the African context. It goes without saying that there is no 
fully developed theoretical framework present as of today. The theoretical part of this paper 
will present the most important theories related to the subject, but will not hold a 
comprehensive study of theories. Related to the chosen theoretical aspects I will develop a 
theoretical background for the analysis.  
Sovereignty in the making is often seen in relation to “nation building”. This term is today 
often confused with “state building”. While the former can be identified as the formation of a 
national identity in a state, the latter is often used in relation to external deliberate efforts to 
install institutions. An important contribution to nation building theories where evolved by 
Stein Rokkan in the early 1970’s. His nation building theory handles the development of the 
Western Europe nation states. The European context is not directly transferable for the 
challenges of nation builders today. There are fundamental different conditions in a totally 
different world situation (Rokkan 1987: 379). Nevertheless, one of his goals was to develop 
an apparatus for comparing political structures for all levels of development, amid all 
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cultures. Nation building, state building and Rokkan will be further emphasized in the 
theoretical approach chapter. 
Scholars looking into African politics often encounter upon the problem of transferability. 
One example being traditional international relations theory, where the state is seen as a 
system with hierarchically ordered units. However, the picture projected of the African 
continent is conflictual and disaster-prone. The relationship between African states is far more 
consensus oriented than traditional international relations theory predicts. As founded in the 
OAU-charter4, the principle of territorial integrity is usually highly regarded and respected in 
the African context. The relationship between African states is most often embossed with 
order and mutual respect. However, the African state is different from the western 
bureaucratic-rational one in many regards. The regimes might be strong, yet the state itself is 
weak. This implies that the order inside the state is not always as predicted by traditional 
international relations theorists. Following, the meaning of established concepts like 
sovereignty and the state might have a different content in the African context (Bøås and 
Dokken 2002: 162-165).  
One of the heritages in Africa from colonialism was the relocation of European values. By the 
transfer of norms, ideas and concepts such as state sovereignty. By the division from colonial 
rule and thereby constructing modern states, the neo-Westphalian institution of state 
sovereignty was introduced and transferred to Africa. Not that there was no sense of 
sovereignty from before, but the institution of state sovereignty certainly influenced the 
transition from colonial rule to independent states. Even though this independence was vested 
on self-determination of the people, in many instances it became an imperative for African 
leaders to rule with exclusive and indivisible sovereignty, not with regards to citizenry 
(Makinda and Okumu 2008: 15-16). 
Nonetheless, sovereignty is a concept with plural meanings. Put in different contexts, it 
implicates contesting views. Sovereignty is often presented as a dichotomy. For instance, 
international legal sovereignty can be defined as: “the international recognition of a state by 
its peers and its formal status in international law, with the attendant attributes of equality 
with other states, non-intervention, self-determination, and territorial integrity” (Englebert 
2009:60). In the words of Jackson and Rosberg this is also termed juridical sovereignty as 
                                                
4 See: Organization of African Unity (1963) The OAU Charter, Article II 1 c, and Article III 1-3. 
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opposed to empirical sovereignty, or negative versus positive sovereignty. The latter implies 
effective rule over their territories and population, or final authority over social, economic, 
and political matters. Negative sovereignty on the other hand, in the African context, is said to 
be resting on the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960, which granted all 
former colonies of Africa sovereignty (Englebert 2009: 61). 
Because African sovereignty is recognized as juridical sovereignty, it is often defined by its 
legality rather than its effectiveness (Englebert 2009: 62). Failures in legal command such as, 
the capacity to control, dominate, extract or dictate through law rests mainly on sovereign 
status. While, the state’s capacity to provide security, order, and public services, or implement 
coherent policies and initiate social transformation, rests on domestic institutional 
effectiveness (Englebert 2009: 62). 
1.2.2 Research question 
The sovereignty in the making project refers to the sets of practices of statecraft that 
cumulatively comprise attempts to achieve juridical sovereignty. Sites of contested 
sovereignty falls into four basic categories: existing polities that are making new or pressing 
old territorial claims, but lack international recognition; old states that are in a state of 
prolonged collapse but still are considered sovereign entities; unitary states that are (re) 
configured into federal arrangements that ‘split’ sovereignty between two or more entities, 
often as a response to civil war or to civic claims for self-determination; and seemingly 
chronic civil war situations related, at least in part, to unrealized sovereignty claims5.  
Given this division of categories, Southern Sudan falls into the third one, a split of 
sovereignty between two entities after a claim for self-determination as a response to 
prolonged civil war. In the case of Southern Sudan this claim has evolved into the 
forthcoming secession of July this year. However, as seen in the previous section on 
theoretical scope, the implications of sovereignty are contested. This soon-to-be independent 
state can be said to be in the middle of an immense state formation process6. International 
recognition, in terms of juridical sovereignty, might seem like an easy achievement from the 
outside. However, with the international society following the development under scrutiny, 
                                                
5 Sovereignty in the making project draft, Fafo AIS. 
6 A further distinction between the two concepts will be done in the theoretical approach chapter. 
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there might be a demand to create not only legality, but also domestic institutional 
effectiveness to gain recognized sovereignty. Therefore I will argue to not to view the case of 
Southern Sudan in light of “sets of practices of statecraft that cumulatively comprise attempts 
to achieve juridical sovereignty”. What is interesting in the case of Southern Sudan is the 
empirical aspect of sovereignty. What is the Government of Southern Sudan doing to improve 
the four chosen variables or dimensions? The answer to this is highly related to the process of 
creating sovereignty. My problem for discussion will be as following: 
How is sovereignty crafted in Southern Sudan? And, what are the challenges in the four 
dimensions of sovereignty in the making? 
To go from theories to practice in this paper, I need to operationalize the four critical 
dimensions of sovereignty have been chosen for further study. They will hopefully have the 
ability to illuminate how political actors attempt to create order and to what ends7. It can also 
be argued that these four dimensions are constitutive of our understanding of the concept of 
sovereignty. The development of indicators is described in section 2.5. 
The methodological scope of this paper is to do a qualitative in-depth study of the four chosen 
variables related to sovereignty in the case of Southern Sudan. It can be classified as a within-
case study (Gerring 2007: 217). However, this single case is part of a larger research project, 
which together holds the potential of doing a cross-case comparison. Data from the individual 
cases, can both be used for in-depth studies as well as for synthesizing analyses that examine 
overarching issues, problem, and themes, to produce generalizable knowledge of interest both 
for policymakers and researchers8. The chosen dimensions will be operationalized into 
observable phenomena and activities, where possible, in order to understand what is being 
done and how.  
It is my assumption that very few of these dimension are in place at this time. The western 
European state developed over centuries and Southern Sudan has only had six years so far. 
However, there might be evidence of and work in progress around these dimensions. I will 
not focus on if they are present or not but rather on in what degree we can speak of 
sovereignty. In the case of Southern Sudan there might be evidence of ‘fussy’ classes, so the 
goal will be to classify as degrees of, not necessarily as evidence of pure forms. The four 
                                                
7 Sovereignty in the making project draft, Fafo AIS. 
8 Sovereignty in the making project draft, Fafo AIS. 
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dimensions will be presented shortly in the following section and further elaborated on in the 
theoretical approach and in the part of the analysis. 
The first chosen dimension, or variable, is security provision defined by the “Sovereignty in 
the making project” as ‘The assertion of territorial control and attempted monopoly of the use 
of violence’9. The core meaning of sovereignty traditionally relates to supreme authority 
within a territory10. Chapter VI of the CPA is the foundation for the security arrangements for 
the interim period. Part ten of the Constitution lays out armed forces, law enforcement 
agencies and security provisions for Southern Sudan in accordance with the National Interim 
Constitution (CPA 2005: Chapter VI). However, this arrangement mainly addresses security 
problems related to hostilities between the regular forces SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF), and to a certain degree militia related to political parties (Rolandsen 2009: 6). 
There are several challenges towards security provisions in the case of South Sudan. They 
mainly relates to a high level of violence and insecurity and a lack of protection of the people 
(Rolandsen 2009: 2). The first, and maybe most obvious, is the continuous fighting with 
dissent rebel forces in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile11. There are also the occurrence of tribal 
and clan fighting often related to cattle rustling. In both cases, the consequence is often 
casualties among civilians and the need to flee the area. After 22 years of civil war, the flow 
of small arms in the communities is substantial. The flow of arms combined with the low 
threshold for using violence to solve conflicts is a lethal combination. As long as the 
government is not able to provide security for its citizens, this flow of arms will not 
voluntarily diminish. Related to the civil war, there is also a need to downsize, demobilize and 
professionalize the army. To enforce security there will be a need to establish police and 
military capacity that is able to deal with instances of local violence in peacetime and address 
the insecurity situation. It is possible that the main obstacle towards security provision in 
South Sudan is the lack of institutional capacity to provide security and prevent, contain and 
solve conflicts (Rolandsen 2010: 1). 
Making the law is one of sovereignty’s attributes as a recognized a quality of statehood. 
“Making laws and being the law is a privilege of the prince” (Englebert 2009: 62). The 
                                                
9 Sovereignty in the making project draft, Fafo AIS. 
10 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/]. 
11 For reported violence see e.g.: IRIN http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=92233 and BBC South Sudan Clashes 
between army and militia kills 57. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13182109 
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second dimension in this paper is administration of justice. In the words of Pierre Englebert, 
“Domestically, state sovereignty manifests itself through legal command, that is, the 
monopolistic capacity of the state to order people around through law” (Englebert 2009: 57). 
How is order and justice in South Sudan (however constituted) established or imposed and 
enforced? The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was incorporated into the Interim 
Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS). This Constitution is the supreme law of Southern 
Sudan as of 2005. There are also several amendments attached to the ICSS. The judiciary is 
structured into the Supreme Court of South Sudan, Courts of Appeal, High Court and County 
Courts. As an addition other courts and tribunals as deemed necessary can be established in 
accordance with the provision of the Constitution and the law (ICSS: 127 (a-d)).  
The third dimension is revenue capture. It relates to how formal and informal governance in 
the territory is funded. The main question being how revenue is captured in South Sudan and 
by whom and what give authority to legislate? Existing framework derives from Chapter III 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It addresses wealth sharing between the two 
signatories of the protocol. There is also work in progress related to revenue capture in the 
new South Sudan Development Plan12. Estimated Government of Southern Sudan revenue 
Sources for 2010 was based on 97.8 % oil revenues and only 1.2 % on personal income tax. 
Customs, VAT and other National Revenue was only 0.4 % and other Goss revenues 0.6 % 
(Statistical Yearbook 2010: 154).  
The 2007 Personal Income Tax Act purpose is to provide rules and arrangements for the 
taxation of income of Southern Sudan taxpayers. It is founded upon the Interim Constitution 
of Southern Sudan of 2005. It grants the Government of Southern Sudan the authority to 
legislate for collecting the personal income tax of Southern Sudan (Personal Income Tax Act 
2007 (2009): 4).  The act further states that income up to 300 SDG per month is not object to 
taxation (0 % tax), while income over 300 SDG per month is taxed at 10 % on the excess over 
the 300 SDG per month (Personal Income Tax Act 2007: 9). According to the National 
Baseline Survey (2009) the average consumption per person per month in Southern Sudan 
was 100 SDG (Statistical Yearbook 2010: 122). This implicates that the existing taxation 
framework does not function as of today. The numbers presented in the previous section 
shows that there is no foundation for taxation when only limited parts of the population have 
                                                
12 Conversation with Torfinn Harding (5 March 2011), member of committee for drafting the South Sudan Development 
Plan. 
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taxable income. The main challenge for the government of South Sudan will be to provide a 
framework that enables revenue capture to decrease the dependence of oil revenues. Creating 
a legal framework that enables taxation of persons as well as businesses might do this. Such a 
framework will also hold a demand to provide public functions or social benefits for the 
population.  
The fourth and last dimension is political institutions and processes. Portrayed as: inclusive 
but not exclusive to elections- how is legitimacy generated or claimed13. Not yet a formal 
independent country, I will have to base the assessment on the interim government and a 
processes in transition. This together with the election of 2009 and the referendum of this 
year. The two main question set out to answer will be; what are the political institutions of 
Southern Sudan? And, can elections (if present) be used to gather legitimacy for the 
government and sovereignty claim?  
As a part of the CPA, the power sharing protocol of 2004 gave SPLM the right to form an 
autonomous government for Southern Sudan. It also included plans to hold general elections 
at all levels of government in 2009. Several political movements and armies where present in 
Southern Sudan prior to the signing of the CPA. GoSS representatives state that these are now 
transformed into political parties and have joined the SPLM in the new government (GOSS 
2010a). According to the Interim Constitution of 2005, the “sovereign authority in Southern 
Sudan is vested in the people and shall be exercised through their democratic and 
representative institutions established by this Constitution and elected by them in regular, 
free and fair elections” (ICSS 2005: Chapter I, 2(1)). Upon independence the country will 
become a republic with a President as Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the 
army. The legislative power will be vested in the government and the unicameral South Sudan 
Legislative Assembly. The election of 2009 and the 2011 referendum can be important in 
relation to claiming legitimacy for the government as well as the sovereignty claim. 
The main challenges ahead are multifaceted. There is a lack or absorbing of political 
opposition and a following need to open up the political space. There is a challenge in 
inclusion of civil society organizations, also operating outside the international non-
governmental organization sector. There is a need for development of new policies and a 
challenge in the implementation of both old and new policies. It will also be of uppermost 
                                                
13 Sovereignty in the making project draft, Fafo AIS 
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importance to create political trust in the population, and reduce corruption together with the 
importance of ethnic alliances in the building of the bureaucracy. 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
Chapter two will further introduce the theoretical approach taken in this paper. Chapter three 
will account for important empirical considerations as a background for the analysis. The 
methodological scope of the paper will be explained in chapter four. Chapter five will further 
elaborate on the four chosen variables to analyze the problematic of the paper. Chapter six 
will hold a conclusion and elaborate on some theoretical reflections.  
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2 Theoretical Approach 
This chapter will present some important concepts and theoretical contributions related to the 
state and sovereignty. Through, raising awareness of what I have called the problem of 
transferability I emphasize that the traditional theories on state and sovereignty might prove 
inadequate in the African context. However, with an eclectic approach to existing theories I 
set out to form a theoretic framework for my thesis. The goal of this chapter is to develop 
dimensions and indicators to apply in my analysis of how sovereignty is crafted in Southern 
Sudan. 
2.1 State sovereignty 
The state is one out of many possible ways of political organizing. Throughout history we 
have seen several types of how political societies are organized. Nevertheless, in the world of 
today the essential foundation and most common form of political organizing is the state. In 
international relations, this is the way we distinguish actors from each other. In international 
relation theories, the state stands as the most common unit of analysis. This kind of 
organizing is identifiable by it being some kind of centralized control over a bounded 
territory. Inside these boundaries the political institutions have monopoly on the use of force, 
separated from other social institutions. The key to state power and consequently closely 
entangled to the state is the concept of sovereignty. Often portrayed as two sides of the same 
coin: external formal independence on the one side, and an internal lawmaking center with 
relations to various interest groups on the other side (Østerud 2007: 44).  
2.1.1 The problem of transferability 
It is today agreed upon that the African state differs from the western European in several 
aspects. The uniqueness of the African state has been expressed in terms of “la politique du 
ventre” (Bayart 1996), “degrees of statehood” (Clapham 1998), and “quasi-states” (Jackson 
1990). This will be further emphasized upon when we later take a closer look into the African 
state. The African state has a different history of development than the Western European 
ones. In Europe, the states developed through a centuries long historical process, with few 
similarities to what has taken place on the African continent. Notwithstanding, there are 
evidence of pre-colonial African political units that where spatially constructed in several 
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different ways. Some were even organized in a hierarchical manner with a centralized power 
that would resemble requirements for sovereign states in the European fashion. However, 
very few pre-colonial African units had the same way of defining fixed and territorially 
bounded space as European ones. It is better understood as establishments residing on a core, 
where their power extended in fading circles (Clapham 2004: 1).  
The African states of today, in territorial terms, where shaped by colonialism in the 18th and 
19th century. When colonial powers departed around 1960, they left behind a new pattern of 
territorial boundaries and ‘new states’. These borders did not necessarily follow social or 
ethnical lines, nor did it develop through a historical process, in the same way as we have 
seen in Europe. Different historical processes will in most cases lead to different outcomes. 
The contrast with the historical consolidation of western European states is striking (Englebert 
2009: 2). It follows from this that established concepts like state and sovereignty might have a 
different content in the African context.  
The argument to rise in this section is that a vast part of theoretical contribution to political 
science is written in a western European context. The African state is not the same as the 
bureaucratic-rational western state. The regimes might be strong but the state itself is often 
considered weak (Bøås and Dokken 2002: 162). Our analytical tools stems from theories 
based on the Western-European state. If the African state is so different, it is possible that the 
same theories prove to be inadequate. However, traditional theories based on the Western-
European context might be useful as a starting point.  
To explain sovereignty in the case of Southern Sudan, it might be useful to map out earlier 
works and theories related to the state and sovereignty. Traditional theories might come in 
handy to further develop theory that better fits the African context, and additionally, enrich 
general theory development. To put up a theoretical framework to analyze sovereignty in the 
case of Southern Sudan, I will have to build on existing theories and literature. I will do this 
by starting of with classical theories on the state and how the state develops, further duck-dive 
into the characteristics of the African state, before I go on to the equivocal concept of 
sovereignty. And last but not least, how these theories can be used to develop dimensions and 
indicators to analyze sovereignty in the making in Southern Sudan.  
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2.2 The modern state 
The modern state arose as a part of an international system of states. The modern system of 
states originated in Western Europe. It is often related to the signing of the treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, as an evocation of the idea of a system consisting of autonomous 
territorially bound, independent and formally equal states. This idea was further consolidated 
in international law theory of the 18th century, and an increasing number of agreements and 
treaties between states since. Around 1871, the system of states consisted of only fifteen units. 
After the Second World War, 51 states were signatories to the UN pact. In 2010 the UN listed 
192 members14. This expanding process has led to the acknowledgement that the ‘principle of 
state’ has become a universal principle with formal sovereignty as the core value (Østerud 
1987: 12). 
Compared to the concept of government or regime, the state is a broader concept. This is 
because it holds the territory, laws, the bureaucratic and military apparatus, as well as some 
ideological justification of the state’s existence (Englebert 2002: 4). Statehood is the status of 
being a state. The foremost influential definition of the modern state is that of Max Weber. He 
emphasizes three aspects of the modern state: its territoriality; its monopoly of the means of 
physical violence; and its legitimacy (Burnham 2003: 513).  
2.2.1 Weber’s bureaucratic-rational state 
To study the phenomena of statehood it is not uncommon to apply Max Weber definition of 
political society. His description of the modern nation-state is when “existence and order is 
continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of 
physical force on the part of the administrative staff” (Weber, cited by Giddens 1985, in 
Dokken 2008). This is not equal to the notion that force is the only requirement that makes a 
political organization a state, but that force can be taken as a last resort to make sure the 
survival of the state. In other words it is a state when it successfully is able to exercise 
legitimate monopoly over organized use of force within its boundaries.  A state is defined by 
its rationalized central bureaucracy that enjoys a legitimate monopoly of organized violence 
over a given territory and population (Dokken 2008: 27-28).  
                                                
14 UN members: http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml 
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2.2.2 State and nation 
In Stein Rokkan's analysis of the structuring of mass-politics, or open political systems, he 
projects a theory of steps in the evolution of the different European political systems. The first 
step is the so-called “state formation” phase, recognized as consolidation of the political 
central power. With regards to Max Weber, it is common to claim that the power of the state 
separates from other institutions, in the way it tries to monopolize force inside its territorial 
boundaries. In other words, among the different forms of organizing society, only the state 
can proclaim legitimate use of force. The characteristics of the state-formation phase are: 
political coordination; increasing centralization; recognition of the state’s sovereignty from 
other states; expansion of public authority throughout its territory with effective physical 
control; and taxation demands and lines for communication. In other words, state formation is 
the institutionalizing and tightening of political rule. This is by Rokkan seen so fundamental 
that, without this phase, it is impossible to talk about politics in the modern denotation of the 
word at all (Hagtvet in Rokkan 1987: 8). Given that this is supposedly the first phase of any 
new state, it might prove useful to apply this traditional theory on the situation in Southern 
Sudan.  
Rokkan’s second phase is what he calls the “nation building” process. In Rokkan’s 
understanding this stage entails the national coordination of language and cultural standards, 
clarification of the state-power’s confessional bindings and activation of the population 
through a gradual allotment of citizen rights into citizenship. Nation building is the foundation 
of the political orders legitimacy - people’s credence in the ruling system right to rule 
(Hagtvet in Rokkan 1987: 8). Given the different circumstances from the historic process of 
African states, they cannot be viewed as nation-states. As a consequence, sovereignty in the 
making in Africa is not nation building. However, it might still be useful to apply this phase 
in terms of the political orders legitimacy. The concept of nation building will be further 
discussed in the following section. 
2.2.3 The formation of new states 
Rokkan acknowledged the contrast between the socio-economic conditions facing the state 
builders in Europe and the conditions prevailing in postcolonial states of the mid-twentieth 
century as “an accumulation of challenges in a very different world environment” (Goody 
1973: 352). Rokkan finds it so contradictory that he asks the question both how these nations 
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were created but also how they sustain and continue to exist at all (Goody 1973: 352). To 
understand how sovereignty in the making proceeds today, there is a need to clarify some 
definitions.  
I have already presented some of the concepts related to the formation of states. Because of its 
ambiguous use, throughout literature on the subject, there is definitely a need to clarify some 
of the concepts related to such, before we move on. Nevertheless, they all have in common 
the assumption that the state is the solution to the problem of political order. Charles Tilly’s 
‘state making’ is often seen in relation to war making15, which makes it not directly relevant 
for this case. However, state making seen alone, as state elites seeking to consolidate power 
and offer security in return for extraction of resources, might come in relevant. In the liberal 
political thought, state making is often seen as a social contracting between ruler and subjects, 
where subjects surrender absolute freedom in return for privileges like order and security. 
This is neither highly relevant, nor applicable as an analytic tool in this case (Dokken 2008: 
28).  
I choose to apply the definition of the following concepts in the following way. I understand 
nation building as the construction of national identity using the power of the state as a 
process of unification of its people. I do acknowledge that identities are important in a state, 
yet I find it secondary in this case. I will not touch upon the identity aspect in this paper, and 
therefore restrain from the concept of nation building. This will be further elaborated on after 
a short introduction to state building. 
State building can be perceived as the external and deliberate efforts to install institutions in a 
newly independent or more often so called failed state. This is relevant to the extent of foreign 
actors role in the creation of an independent South Sudan. I acknowledge the importance of 
the international community in enabling sovereignty in Southern Sudan. Without international 
diplomacy, funding, capacity building and aid, Southern Sudan would not be in the position 
they are today. However, to explore sovereignty in the making we need to understand the 
internal efforts in Southern Sudan. Therefore I have chosen not to focus on the international 
community’s role in this process.  
                                                
15 Charles Tilly (1985) War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Bringing the State Back In, Evans Peter B., D. 
Rueschmeyer and T. Skocpol 1985 Cambridge University Press.) 
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In the introduction chapter I touched upon the relation between sovereignty in the making and 
nation building and already argued to restrain from this concept. In many aspects, what is 
going on in Southern Sudan today might better be viewed as state building. In the words of 
Alan Whaites, state building is “the process through which states enhance their ability to 
function” (Whaites 2008: 4). I chose to view state building on these terms, not in relation to 
external efforts. I find state building more relevant for the African context, given that nation 
building as a concept plays on assumptions taken from western states with a common culture, 
language or history as the driving force. African states are not nation states. For instance, in 
African countries territorial borders does not traditionally play the same role as we are used to 
in Western Europe. There might exist narratives of origin that does not correspond with the 
territorial borders the state is supposed to have territorial integrity over. Southern Sudan is not 
a unified people with common traditions and language. The demarcation of a border is not in 
respect to any natural aspects but solely the heritage from colonial rule. 
Rokkan acknowledges that there is a problem with ‘new sovereignty’ and the short time it has 
available to build institution, because of enormous external and internal pressure. New states 
face established models for what is expected for the successful development of a state 
(Rokkan 1987: 357).  This becomes quite evident in the case of Southern Sudan. If we go 
back and look at Rokkan's phases of development, Southern Sudan is a new state and does 
therefore belong in the first phase of state formation. However, it might look like it has 
entered into the second phase at the same time.  Political legitimacy can be achieved through 
activation of the population in the election and the referendum.  What European states was 
given centuries to develop, in a different historical context, Southern Sudan is supposed to 
have develop in a relatively short period of time. 
2.3 The African state  
As mentioned earlier, it is today widely accepted that the African state differs from the 
western state. African states did not emerge as a result of a long period of social, economic, 
political, scientific and religious development undergone by Africans. The basic conflict 
between nation and state is far from being resolved.  In general they are centered on pluralistic 
nations not homogenous states. These types of political systems did not fit the Westphalian 
system and made their development in a post-colonial framework rather problematic 
(Malaquias 2001: 13-14). The nation-state has not been the basis for African governance 
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(Clapham 2007: 227). The African state has been described by several names, mostly in a 
pessimistic nature16.  Yet, Africa is not without politics or political progress. Thus, when 
coerced into a strict western model it might appear that way. There are alternative models for 
socio-political organizations and there is a need to recognize the discursive way the Africans 
constructs the state (Dunn 2001: 62). 
2.3.1 Rational-legal and patrimonial authority 
The African state is often described as a type of state that functions in between a legal 
bureaucratic-rational and a personal relations framework. Weber differentiated what he called 
rational-legal from patrimonial authority. Rational-legal authority holds the public sphere 
strongly separated from the private sphere. Written laws and bureaucratic institutions guide 
the exercise of authority. Patrimonial authority on the other hand holds a notion that the 
public and private sphere is closely intertwined and was highly applicable to pre-colonial 
African societies (Dokken 2008: 35).  
A clean-cut patrimonial model does not hold for how the African state function today. Yet, 
the separation between office and person and politics and economics may not always be in 
place. This is what is often referred to as tight patron-client relations. Political office is often 
also enabling personal economic gains, which is also dependent on political positions. 
However, there are both written law and bureaucratic institutions present. This does not 
however create chaos. It actually creates social order and organization, but from another logic 
than in the ideal model of the Westphalian national state (Bøås and Dokken 2002: 12-14).  
Jean François Médard starts of with Weber’s ideal type patrimonial17 and develops it into 
what he called the “neo-patrimonial” state. This is because he finds the African state to be a 
fusion between legal-bureaucratic and patrimonial norms (Médard 1991: 325). The prefix 
‘neo’ stems from the thought that this is not an ideal type, but a hybrid form. Similar to the 
concept of neopatrimonialism is Jean- François Bayart’s “politics of the belly”. This concept 
also emphasizes the interconnectedness between the government and the private sector 
                                                
16 Scholars on the subject has named African states as: ‘failed’ (Leys 1976), ‘lame’ (Sandbrooke 1985), ‘fictive’ (Callagy 
1987), ‘weak’ (Rothchild 1987), ‘collapsing’ (Diamond 1987), ‘quasi’ (Migdal 1988), ‘invented’ and ‘imposed’ (Jackson 
1990) ‘shadow’ (O’Brien 1991), ‘overdeveloped’ and ‘centralized’ (Davidson 1992), ‘swollen’ (Zartman 1995), ‘soft’ 
(Herbst 1996) ‘extractive’ and ‘parasitic’ (Clark 1998), ‘premodern’ (Busan 1998 and ‘poststate’ (Boone 1998), all of 
which focus on the dysfunctionallity of the African states and underlines a rhetoric of state failure (Dunn 2001: 46). 
17 Patrimonial is used by Weber to describe the principles of authority in the smallest and most traditional polities (Dokken 
2008: 35). 
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(Bayart ([1989] 1996). The privatization of the public happens in a state were extraction and 
redistribution are caught in between government and private sector. Some main consequences 
are personalized power, politics that becomes business and mass-politics that are structured 
around vertical cliental relationships (Bøås and Dunn 2007: 22).  
2.3.2 Guerrilla government and big men 
The weak structures of African states and the low degree of accountability open up for 
political elites to prey on society. People with access to state authority, at all levels of the 
society, can extract resources if connected to a political patron (Englebert in Bøås and Dunn 
2007: 59). This possibility of personal enrichment and extraction might be an incentive for 
rebel groups fighting for political power. When rebel groups win access to state structures, 
army commanders and warlords becomes the political elite.  
 This can also be seen in relation to so-called big men18 in Africa as described by Bayart. In 
the case of Southern Sudan, this might be relevant. Former army commanders are now 
members of government institutions. Jean-François Bayard called this “elite accommodation”.  
Reno calls it the shadow state. To create the outward appearance of sovereignty (exclusive 
control over people and territory) the elite makes informal deals with individuals (in this case 
other warlords and chiefs) who exercise power over groups or territories (Reno 1998: 2).  
Positions of power enable resource extraversion. A job in the bureaucracy is not only salary 
but holds perks and benefits and the advantage of holding a public position like networks. 
Positions of power can use legitimate monopoly of violence to take hold of products, cash and 
labor. Political positions as well as civil servants access enrichment through bribes or 
corruption (Bayart 1996: 104-108). In Southern Sudan, the elite in the SPLM/A has gone 
from being army commanders into positions of government. This opens up the possibility of 
finding traces of neopatrimonalism in Southern Sudan. Especially related to elite 
accommodation and big men. To create the impression of exclusive control over people and 
territory, there might be evidences of including potential rivals and big men into power 
positions.  
We have now been through several aspects of the state. What the state is in the traditional 
western aspects as well as some aspects related to the state in Africa.  Given the special 
                                                
18 Jean-François Bayart (1993) The State in Africa, chapter two, The Unequal state: Little Men and Big men. 
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circumstances of the African state it is likely that sovereignty also differs in the African 
context. The concept of state and sovereignty is also closely related in literature on the 
African context. Robert H. Jackson labeled the ex-colonial states of Africa as ‘quasi-states’. 
His argument is that African states are sovereign only in the legal aspect of the definition, 
because they often are deficient in many aspects we consider important for independent 
statehood in the western context (Jackson 1990: 21). Christopher Clapham (1998) builds upon 
Jackson’s definition and classifies the African state in terms of degrees of statehood. He says 
that statehood should be regarded as a relative concept (Clapham 1998: 143). To further 
understand these differences we have to move to the concept of sovereignty. 
2.4 The concept of sovereignty 
There can be said to be a conceptual confusion related to the concepts of state and 
sovereignty. Neither of the two is understood in exactly the same way within a particular 
academic discipline, let alone across various disciplines (Hashami 1997: 4). Before it is 
possible to say anything about what sovereignty might implicate for a new African state, there 
is a need to look into what has been said on the subject of sovereignty. 
In a dictionary of politics ‘sovereignty’ is defined as “the claim to be the ultimate political 
authority, subject to no higher power as regards the making and enforcing of political 
decisions. In the international system, sovereignty is the claim by the state to full self-
government, and the mutual recognition of claim to sovereignty is the basis of international 
society” (Buzan 2003: 502). Even thought the definition of sovereignty is rather clear, there 
are several forms of sovereignty that need to be distinguished from each other in a proper 
way.  
2.4.1 Forms of sovereignty 
Krasner identifies four ways in which the term sovereignty is used. ‘Domestic sovereignty’ is 
the ability of the state in question to control its domestic affaires. Interdependence sovereignty 
refers to a state’s ability to control cross-border issues. International legal sovereignty 
concerns international recognition, both territorially and otherwise. And, Westphalian 
sovereignty, which refers to a state’s negative right to non-interference in domestic affaires 
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(Krasner 1999: 3-4). However, he does not consider the African state while investigating the 
concept of sovereignty. 
Another important contributor on the subject is Robert H. Jackson and he takes the context of 
the post-colonial African state into consideration. His dichotomy of positive and negative 
sovereignty derives from the cognate ideas of negative and positive liberty made famous by 
Isaiah Berlin. Individuals possess liberty, while sovereignty is a possession of the state. 
Negative sovereignty can be defined as freedom from outside interference. As well as the 
legal foundation upon which a society of independent and formally equal states fundamentally 
rests (Jackson 1990: 26-27). The responsibility of the state (as opposed to the individual) is 
both external to other sovereigns and internal to citizens (Jackson 1990: 28). 
Positive sovereignty is a substantive rather than a formal condition. It does not only enjoy 
rights of non-intervention and other international immunities but also possesses the 
wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens. The state must be able to take 
advantage of its independence. It is relative and changing, because states are in constant 
change, unlike negative sovereignty, which is an absolute condition (Jackson 1990: 29). All 
recognized states enjoy negative sovereignty, however not all are able to take advantage of 
their independence (Jackson 1990: 30). The concept of positive and negative sovereignty is 
closely related to the failed states rhetoric and must be seen in the light of this debate. 
Christopher Clapham (1998) also mention negative and positive sovereignty, but he further 
develops the concept into degrees of statehood. He moves away from the clean-cut dichotomy 
and explains sovereignty in the sub-Saharan context that entities meets criteria of sovereignty 
too lesser or greater extent (Clapham 1998: 143). He wishes to encompass the recognition that 
not all states are the same. In what he calls the decline of quasi-statehood, he argues that 
negative sovereignty is temporary and only a device for new states to become a part of the 
international order. At some point their inadequacies will be revealed and to proper claim 
sovereignty the new state will have to develop effective institutions (Clapham 1998: 146). 
Negative and positive are words that implies certain meanings. I find it better to use juridical 
and empirical sovereignty in order to recognize the nature of sovereignty. These definitions 
were used by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg when it came to highlight the fact that African 
states often gain sovereignty from international recognition rather than from performances 
related to effective rule over territories and populations (Englebert 2009: 60). All states rely 
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on a combination of external recognition and domestic power, however the balance of the two 
might vary a great deal. Most states were at some point dependent on the role of the 
international system in their formation and creation of empirical sovereignty (Clapham 1998: 
144). 
Instead of labeling all sub-Saharan countries in the rhetoric of “failed” states, I find it more 
interesting to view them in the light of how they meet criteria of statehood to lesser or greater 
extent. These states might be hybrids, with some dysfunctional aspects but also parts that 
resemble institutional apparatus operating by Weberian norms (Englebert 2009: 8). The most 
fruitful approach for this paper will be to start of with juridical and empirical sovereignty, 
without looking at them as closed categories, but in relations to Clapham's concept. If South 
Sudan gains international recognition we can talk about juridical sovereignty. In the degree 
the new country enables security provision, administration of justice, revenue captures and 
political processes and institutions we can begin to identify outlines of empirical sovereignty.  
2.5 Developing dimensions and indicators 
In relation to Weber, the state as a territorially bound unit has been closely connected to the 
concept of sovereignty. The foundation of the structure is a geographically bound unit, 
ideally, with control of its borders. However, territory alone is not sufficient. Especially in the 
African context were borders have a different historical background. There are certain 
functions that a state has to successfully enable for its citizens to call itself a modern state. 
First and foremost, it has to be able to provide security to its citizens, ideally in terms of a 
monopoly on the use of armed force. Second, it has to administer general justice, provide a 
legal framework to protect citizen’s rights. Third, it requires redistributive functions in terms 
of revenue capture, to provide social services for the population as well as to run state 
functions. Fourth, but not the least, it requires political processes and institutions to legitimize 
and provide representativeness of the rulers for the people (Dokken 2008: 28).  
It is not unreasonable to say that these four functions have been absent in the case of Southern 
Sudan until recently. A long lasting process of marginalization and decades of war has led to 
a non-existent state. Developments in these four functions can be seen as increase in state 
capacity, which in the case of Southern Sudan can progress empirical sovereignty. To further 
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investigate progress in these four functions it is necessary to further develop these functions 
or dimensions and apply measurable indicators. 
In a paper on state building by Alan Whaites (2008), he introduces political settlement, 
survival functions and expected functions as the three necessary areas in the process of state 
building. Political settlement consists of elite consolidation, the understanding and explicit 
articulation of a settlement, and actors that arise as aspiring government. In the case of 
Southern Sudan, the political settlement can be seen as the emergence of the SPLM/A as a 
political elite, together with explicit articulation through the signing of the CPA.  This first 
necessary area of progress is seen as fulfilled in the case of Southern Sudan. The peace deal 
has made it possible for SPLM/A as the Government of Southern Sudan, to start a process of 
state formation by addressing needs in survival and expected functions. The period following 
the signing of the CPA makes the starting point for my thesis.  
Survival functions are core functions that are essential for the survival and strengthening of 
the institutional framework of the state. Whaites advocate three survival functions:  
• “Security – to be able to control, if not monopolise, the use of violence;  
• Revenue – the ability to raise funds sustainably, particularly through taxation; and  
• Law – the capability to rule through laws; and be seen to do this” (Whaites 2008: 8). 
Security is often given prevalence in traditional theory, as seen in relation to Weber. 
However, there is a mutual reinforcing relationship between this three survival functions. 
Security is expensive and has to be paid for. Revenues raise income for a state, which can be 
used on providing security (or building institutions). However, domestic revenue capture 
through taxation is more likely to strengthen state structures and generate expectations of 
accountability. The issue of law has been under more debate, but is highly significant in 
relation to building trust towards the political settlement and in relation to delivery on public 
expectations. It is also complementary to security. Through laws, the state can make known 
under which conditions it is providing security and thereby engender predictability of state 
behavior. Laws are also important in the way they create standards and extend measures that 
can create wealth and develop tax collection (Whaites 2008: 8-9). As already mentioned, the 
three survival functions are reinforcing and overlapping. Developments in one can contribute 
to developments in another. 
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While survival functions are seen as important for maintaining a minimum level of control, 
expected functions are related to how the state should perform in relation to issues important 
to its citizens (Whaites 2008: 9). The relationship between the survival functions and political 
institutions can be seen as “areas that those dominant within the political settlement must 
attend to first, and most effectively, if they want the instruments of the state to be their vehicle 
for policy” (Whaites 2008: 10). This contributes to adding a fourth dimension in analyzing 
how sovereignty is crafted in Southern Sudan. The development of political process and 
institutions is highly related to the developments in the three other functions.  
2.5.1 Security provision 
To analyze progress in the four chosen functions it is necessary to operationalize each one of 
them into measurable indicators. I have chosen to measure security provision in terms of the 
governments ability to: 1) obtain territorial control and control on the use of violence; 2) their 
ability to enforce order; and 3) their efforts towards disarmament in the population. The first 
indicator is highly related to Weber and traditional theory, however sustain from using the 
term monopoly in accordance with Whaites definition better suited for the nascent state. It 
will be measured by the effectiveness of the military (SPLA), control of rebel movements and 
the LRA, and inter- and intra-communal fighting. The second indicator lays somewhere 
between the expansion of monopoly of violence and coercion, and empirical considerations in 
Southern Sudan. It will be measured by looking into the law enforcement capacity of the 
police, criminality and informal security provision. The third indicator is closely connected to 
empirical considerations in Southern Sudan. Decades of civil war have led to a highly 
militarized society where the immense flow of arms is a constant threat towards security. 
Disarmament is an important step towards providing security for the population as well as the 
expansion of control of violence. The last indicator will be measured by the efforts towards 
addressing the flow of small arms and the reintegration of soldiers. 
2.5.2 Administration of justice 
To measure the administration of justice in Southern Sudan, have chosen the following 
indicators: 1) developments in relation to the implementation of a legal system; 2) the 
capability to rule through law, and to the extent the government is seen to do this; and 3) 
implementations towards the protection of vulnerable groups. The first indicator will able to 
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detect progress, if any, in efforts towards administration of justice through looking for a 
judiciary, a constitution and a framework of laws. The second indicator is connected to 
Whaites definition of rule of law. It will be measured by local perceptions of the justice 
system based on a case study by Leonardi et al. (2010). The third is an extension of the 
second, given that vulnerable groups are often the ones most sensible to the lack of a legal 
system. It will be measured by how the poor, women and children are treated in the justice 
sector. All three of the indicators can be seen in relation to Stein Rokkan’s second phase of 
state formation, in relation to a state’s confessional bindings and allotment of citizen’s rights. 
2.5.3 Revenue capture 
The importance of domestic revenue capture through taxation has been emphasized, but will 
be further explored in the analysis by linking it to the resource curse debate. The assessment 
of revenue capture will be based on the governments ability to the 1) creation of an economic 
infrastructure; 2) policy and implementation of personal income tax; and 3) measures taken 
towards taxation of business and tariffs on trade. Even if less theoretically grounded, it is 
pending on the idea that the state is in need of economic infrastructure to raise domestic funds 
sustainably, that enables progress in the other dimensions. Sustainable internal revenues have 
the potential to create linkages between government and society and generate expectations of 
accountability (Whaites 2008: 8). The first indicator will be measured by looking for financial 
properties of a state, like a bank system and a ministry of finance. The second indicator will 
be measured by the presence and effectiveness of a personal income tax. The third indicator 
will be measured by the presence and effectiveness of taxation of business and tariffs on 
trade. 
2.5.4 Political processes and institutions 
The last dimension or function, political processes and institutions, can be viewed as the most 
important for this paper. Developments in this sector can be seen as a driving force for all the 
other dimensions as well as highly related to enabling sovereignty in the first place. This last 
function of this paper is highly related to the concept of empirical sovereignty and can be seen 
as an indicator on domestic institutional effectiveness. Political processes and institutions can 
be measured in several ways, given that this concept can include a variety of aspects. In the 
case of Southern Sudan I have chosen to measure it according to the following two indicators: 
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1) political institutions present in Southern Sudan; and 2) the legitimacy of the authorities 
through the election and referendum processes. The first aspect will handle the background 
for political institutions, and be measured according to the presence of a legislative and 
executive branch19, as well as the GoSS achievements in including or controlling 
complementary and contesting forms of authority. The second aspect will analyze the political 
processes related to election and referendum, on the assumption that these processes express 
the peoples trust in the ruling systems right to rule. This assessment will be done mainly on 
the foundation of international actors (European Union Election Observation Mission and the 
Carter Center) monitoring reports from the election and referendum. The theoretical 
background both indicators are Stein Rokkan’s phases as introduced earlier in this chapter. 
His initial phase of institutionalizing and tightening of political rule is reflected in the first 
indicator. The second indicator reflects Rokkan’s second phase. The assessment of process 
surrounding the 2010 general election and the 2011 Referendum is used as an indicator of 
people’s credence in the ruling systems right to rule. 
2.6 Sovereignty in the making 
In this chapter I have gone through some of the most relevant theories and literature on 
aspects related to the state and sovereignty. The state is the most common way to organize 
political order and it is clearly entangled to the concept of sovereignty. Nevertheless, these are 
concepts developed in a Western context. Because of the different historical processes and the 
problem of transferability, state and sovereignty might not denote the same in the African 
context. However, theories and literature from a western perspective have proven useful in 
building an analytic framework for sovereignty in the making in Southern Sudan. From the 
various forms of sovereignty out there, it was possible to find concepts like juridical and 
empirical sovereignty that makes sense in the African context. Weber’s monopoly on violence 
and Rokkan’s phases of state-formation proved helpful in the process of developing 
dimensions and indicators for my analysis. Clapham’s degrees of statehood might also be an 
interesting perspective when it comes to analyzing achievements in the four dimensions.  
 
 
                                                
19 The judiciary could have been integrated into this section, but will be handled under the administration of justice. 
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3 Empirical considerations 
In the theoretical approach it was emphasized that the concept of the state does not necessarily 
imply the same in a Southern Sudan context. This part will further elaborate on that by 
exploring what lies behind the formation of Southern Sudan. This is only supposed to be a 
short introduction and a preparation for the analysis, not a throughout description of historic 
events20.  
3.1 Traditional organizing 
In pre-colonial Southern Sudan, political organization was formed as communal societies. 
Apart from some agriculturalists, most communities were semi-nomadic and dependent on 
cattle. Inter-ethnic conflict often related to the raiding of cattle and women. The cattle was 
very important because of it value as an economic assets and women for agricultural and 
household help (Breidlid 2010: 48).  
Southern Sudan consists of three main ethnic groups. They can be broadly categorized into: 
Nilotic communities that resides mainly in the Upper Nile and the greater Bahr El Ghazal 
region, the Nilo-Hamitic communities that are to be found in Equatoria, and the South 
Western Sudanic groups in Equatoria and Western Bahr El Ghazal. However these three 
broad categories are further divided into a multitude of ethnic groups (GOSS 2010c):  
• The Nilotic people consists of the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Murle, Kachiopo, Jie, 
Anyuak, Acholi, Maban, Kuma, Luo (Jur), Bango, Bai, Ndogo, Gulu, Edri, Forgee, 
Chod (Jur), Khara, Ngorgule, Forugi, Siri, Zandi, Benga, Agar, Pakam, Gok, Ciec, 
Aliap, Hopi, Guere, Atuot, Apaak, Lango, Pari Otuho and Ajaa.  
• The Nilo-Hamitic people consists of the Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Pojulu, Nyangwara, 
Kuku, Latuko, Lokoya, Toposa, Buya, Lopit, Kakwa, Nyabgwara, Tennet, Lopit and 
Didinga.  
• And, the South-Western Sudanic people include Kresh, Balanda, Banda, Ndogo, 
Azande, Madi, Olubo, Murus, Mundu, Baka, Avukaya and Makaraka.  
                                                
20 For a complete historical background see e.g. Johnson (2003), Breidlid (2010), Collins (2008) and Woodward (1990). 
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For the purpose of this paper, there will only be focus on a few of these groups, mainly the 
Dinka and the Nuer. The following section will explore forms of organizing in Southern 
Sudan, for this purpose I will mention Shilluk, Bari and Azande. These, together with Dinka 
and Nuer, are also the largest groups in Southern Sudan21. 
In numbers, the Dinka is the largest ethnic group in Southern Sudan. They took residence in 
the Bahr-el-Ghazal region between 1650 and 1700. At the time they were technologically and 
economically superior and entered the region with better cattle and resistant sorghum. 
However, the Dinka had no tradition of centralized authority. They were clan based and their 
culture evolved around the cattle. It is said that a Dinka man is willing to risk his life for 
protecting or raiding new cattle (Breidlid 2010: 52). The Nuer is the second largest group in 
Southern Sudan. They were located in the Upper Nile Province and in the Bahr-el-Ghazal as 
well as in Western Ethiopia. Because of the threat of slave raiding, the Nuer migrated towards 
Dinka territory and the two cultures merged. However, because of the constant conflict over 
cattle, the divide into two different ethnic groups prevails. The Nuer society is kin-based and 
with no centralized political organization. Conflict is kept in check by varying alliances that 
shifts depending on the issue of the conflict (Breidlid 2010: 54-55). The Nuer and the Dinka 
are both Nilotic communities. 
The Shilluk where unique among the Nilotic tribes because they where organized as a 
centralized nation. The Reth (divine king) where recognized by all the Shilluk settlements 
(Breidlid 2010: 56-58). The Bari is a Nilotic-Hamitic people that reside around the Juba 
region. They rely on subsistence mixed farming, while livestock is kept as a supplement to the 
diet and gifts when people marry (Breidlid 2010: 63-64). The Azande group is of the South-
Western Sudanic groups and considered the third largest group in Southern Sudan. They 
differ from Nuer and Dinka mainly by way of subsistence. Traditionally they have been 
gatherers and agriculturalists focusing on subsistence cultivation. The group is culturally 
diverse but have been assimilated into a common system of cultural practice and customs, 
however with different military and political strategies. Their society was highly hierarchical 
with autonomous kingdoms (Breidlid 2010: 66-67). All the different tribes mentioned here are 
further divided into smaller tribes and belonging to the same main tribe does not necessarily 
mean homogenous identity.  
                                                
21 See figure 1: Ethnic groups in Sudan. 
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Figure 1: Ethnic groups in Sudan. 
 
(BBC 2011b) 
3.2 Colonial rule 
The whole of Sudan was under the rule of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium from the 19th 
century and onwards. Under colonial rule administration of the north and the south were 
separated with the introduction of the Closed District Order (Breidlid 2010: 112). The 1930 
declaration of a “Southern Policy” stated that the South was supposed to develop along 
“African” and not “Arab” lines. The objective was to administer Southern Sudan together 
with the other countries of British East Africa. The British policy of indirect rule came to be 
called “Native Administration” in Southern Sudan.  The institutionalizing of Chief’s courts 
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was a fusion between indigenous customs and British innovation. However, the courts and 
administration of the more hierarchically organized communities developed on much more 
bureaucratic lines than pastoralist communities. Policy also opened up for Christian missions 
in the south, that were marginally tolerated to the extent they provided schools and education. 
The different systems of administration in the north and the south laid some of the foundation 
for divergence of practice and the future institutionalization of neglect and marginalization 
from the regime in Khartoum (Johnson 2003: 11-14). 
3.3 The first civil war 
The outbreak of the first civil war between the north and the south started with the Torit 
Mutiny a few months before independence in January 1956 (Johnson 2003: 21). The first civil 
war lasted until the negotiation of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972. The failure to 
implement the agreement and the issues it failed to resolve led to the outbreak of a second 
civil war at the beginning of the 1980’s (Johnson 2003: 39).  By 1983, John Garang had 
become the leader of new organization that we today now as SPLM/A. The goal of this new 
organization was not announced as southern separation from the north, rather focused on the 
need to address specific grievances over failures in the Addis Ababa Agreement. The vision 
was a “New Sudan” with a restructuring of the central government and autonomous or federal 
governments for the various regions (Johnson 2003: 61-65).  
3.4 SPLM/A administration 
In the beginning the SPLM/A did not see itself as a possible provisional government for 
Southern Sudan, because its goal was to change the governmental structures of Sudan as a 
whole. In the areas they controlled they relied almost entirely on the old structures of the 
Native Administration. They recognized old chieftaincies and created some new ones. Chief 
courts continued to be the place for hearing cases under customary law. Chief court’s also 
organized public projects like collecting taxes and building roads. Some inter-tribal courts 
were set up to solve inter-community issues. The only difference was that this was done under 
supervision of SPLA officers, the Civil/Military Administrators and Area or Zonal 
commanders. The local participation or representation in structures above the chief’s court 
was close to nothing. However, civil administration in Southern Sudan has never been strong. 
Under Southern Regional government before the second civil war, the erosion of 
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infrastructure continued. So criticism towards the failure of providing services by the SPLA, 
has to be seen in this historical aspect (Johnson 2003: 105). The SPLA started a process of 
administrative restructuring in 1991, which culminated in the 1994 National Convention 
(Johnson 2003: 106). The National Convention will be further emphasized in my analysis.  
An administrative consequence of the implementation of reforms was the establishment of a 
new system with bomas, payams and counties replacing the old system of three provinces 
divided into thirty districts. This was a result of SPLM/A policy towards winning confidence 
of local population through encouraging civil institutions at local level (Rolandsen 2005: 
161). The division into states, counties, payams and bomas has been adopted into the GoSS 
administration. To explain how this division works: States are divided into a number of 
counties. The size and boundaries of counties still varies given that administrative changes are 
still taking place. Counties are further divided into payams, which usually consists of a small 
number of bomas or what are equivalent to villages.  
3.5 From the second civil war to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement 
Throughout the second civil war there were several splits and defections from SPLM/A, both 
in relation to ethnicity but more often in terms of ideology. The SPLA has often been 
portrayed as the Dinka army. The long history of inter- and intra-ethnic fighting between 
various communities in the south continued throughout the civil war (Johnson 2003: 65-69). 
Lessons from the first civil war led to a SPLA policy of preventing military factionalism. The 
political price for this was a focus on military means and coercion, rather than developments 
in the political wing of the organization. Changes in the political organization and alteration 
in policy were recognized first towards the end of the 1980s. Yet the issue of accountability 
and need for more democratic procedures was not raised until the early 1990s, by two senior 
commanders of Upper Nile: Riek Machar and Lam Akol. They also initiated the removal of 
John Garang from his position. This attempt of overthrow has been named the Nassir coup 
and lead to a split in the SPLM/A and a decade of internal strife. It also brought forward the 
issue of self-determination and Southern independence.  
Several attempts on separate deals and international involvement in negotiations was initiated 
during this time. The long delayed reconciliation of John Garang and Riek Machar did not 
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happen until 2002 (Johnson 2003: 93-126). International and regional efforts as well as 
changes in military balance and political organization in both the south and north, enabled the 
process that would finally lead to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
200522.  
 
                                                
22 See Johnson, Hilde F. (2011) Waging Peace in Sudan: The inside Story of the Negotiations That Ended Africa’s Longest 
Civil War.  
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4 Methodological scope 
This paper looks into sovereignty in the making, or the emergence of sovereign power in 
Southern Sudan. This is done through investigating empirical evidence for actual practices of 
statehood related to four chosen dimensions. My argument is that even though Southern 
Sudan is not yet a formally recognized state, it is in the process of crafting sovereignty.  
Southern Sudan is in many ways a unique case, and one of very few examples of a breach of 
what Pierre Englebert calls the resilience of the African state (Englebert 2009: 1). Of the 
methodological challenges I faced during this research process, deciding on the best scientific 
approach was the first of many. There was no consistent theoretical framework ready to use, a 
limited literature on the subject and a rather abstract nature of the process in question (crafting 
of sovereignty), in a complex and constantly changing environment. I found great support in 
structuring my thesis from an earlier published master thesis on a related topic. Narve Nub 
Kveseth Rotwitt’s thesis on Somalia and Islamic Courts Union23, uses a similar approach and 
several of the same variables in investigating political control in a stateless society. This is in 
accordance with the scientific principle of building on existing research in a relatively 
unexplored field.  
Common for all social research is the dialog between ideas and evidences. “Ideas help 
researchers make sense of evidence, and researchers use evidence to extend, revise, and test 
ideas” (Ragin 1994: 55). Ideas in this regard can be translated to theories, and evidence is 
viewed as data. This thesis is an attempt to embark on this dialogue. By interpreting the data 
collected, with regards to the research question I set out to answer, in the theoretical 
framework I presented in Chapter two. The end goal of the dialogue between ideas and 
evidence is to improve understanding of a social phenomenon. In this case what is being done 
in the process of building sovereignty in Southern Sudan. At the time of writing, there was no 
certainty that South Sudan would become an independent nation. The situation was changing 
on an everyday basis and the final outcome was unknown.  
One common way to differentiate social research is between deduction and induction. This 
thesis however builds on the interplay between the two, or what is also known as retroduction. 
                                                
23 Rotwitt, Narve Nub Kveseth (2010) Somalia and Islamic Courts Union: New Dimensions of Political Control in a 
stateless society, Masteroppgave i statsvitenskap, Institutt for statsvitenskap, Oslo: Universitetet i Oslo. 
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It is necessary to start out with some initial ideas and at the same time have the goal to 
advance theory (Ragin 1994: 47). This also reflects the interchange of ideas and evidence as 
mentioned earlier. Where ideas rest on the existing theoretical framework and evidence are 
collected data. The scientific approach taken in this thesis follows the same logic. It is non-
positivist in nature by acknowledging that all science is somehow constructed. Mainly 
because of the complex nature of the process in question, some aspects will be left alone. Data 
is selected, not gathered and will not be able to cover every relevant aspect. However, I set 
out with the goal of covering the most important aspects on how sovereignty is created in 
Southern Sudan. 
4.1 Research design  
Qualitative research offers the possibility to refine and elaborate on images and concepts, and 
is especially appropriate for advancing theory (Ragin 1994: 83). When moving from an idea 
towards understanding social life, there is a need of a strategy, or design. A research design 
“is a plan for collecting and analyzing evidence that will make it possible for the investigator 
to answer whatever question he or she has posed” (Ragin 1994: 26). The preexisting 
theoretical framework is highly important in designing a case study. Guidance from 
preliminary theoretical concepts will increase the understanding of the topic, help define the 
unit of analysis, suggest relevant variables and guide the selection and collection of data (Yin 
2003a: 3).   
The goal of this thesis is to search for empirical evidence of acts of statesmanship in Southern 
Sudan after the instigation of the CPA in 2005. The research question is exploratory in nature 
and the theoretical framework lacks considerations for the African context. Both points 
towards that the application of a case study would be the most productive take in carrying out 
this research. When the phenomenon under study is not easily distinguishable from its 
context, the case study might come in handy (Yin 2003a: 4). 
”A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin 2003b: 13). This is an easily defendable approach when looking into 
how sovereignty is crafted in Southern Sudan. It is a contemporary phenomenon that has to be 
seen in conjunction with its contextual conditions. The contextual condition in Southern 
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Sudan is far from the reality faced by western European countries. The phenomenon of 
sovereignty must be studied in the special Southern Sudan context to fully understand the 
event that is taking place and cannot be fully understood if separated from the real life 
context. 
The most important challenge of the case study is how to generalize from the case study to 
theory. The case study opens up the possibility to enlighten a social phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, I also sat out to improve or develop theory. This is challenging, but can be done 
by not stringent follow the urge to prove any hypothesis, and rather look for other alternative 
answers. Another challenge in a case study is judging the quality of the research design. To 
improve the quality of empirical social research it is common to apply certain logical test in 
terms of methodological criteria (Yin 2003b: 33-34). 
4.2 Methodological criteria 
To make sure that the research design represents a logical set of statements, it is common to 
apply certain methodological criteria. In social research these are validity and reliability. In 
general, validity refers to how the intended point or claim is actually supported. Reliability on 
the other hand, concerns how accurate the operationalized variables are measured. Both are 
methodological criteria that help us to avoid pitfalls in scientific research. Methodological 
criteria must be seen in relation to the specific research in question. Therefore I will focus on 
internal, external and construct validity, together with reliability, which are the most relevant 
in a case study. 
4.2.1 Internal validity 
Internal validity relates to the causal relationship between variables (Skog 1998: 107). The 
case study is often endorsed for its possibilities to reach internal validity. ”[I]ts easier to 
establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to a single case” (Gerring 2007: 43). 
The casual premise here is more or less taken for granted. Sovereignty relies on the exertion 
of security provision, administration of justice, revenue capture and political processes and 
institutions. I do acknowledge that this might be a weakness of the thesis. This causal premise 
takes what the state is supposed to be for granted. Due to the fact that most assumptions about 
sovereignty are developed in a Western European context, it would be better to study actual 
35 
 
practices of statecraft in this case. The causal relationship should therefore be viewed as a 
reciprocal process. Sovereignty in the making is a process where increase in one variable, can 
support increase in another variable and eventually then move towards sovereignty. One way 
to improve validity in this context is to address contesting explanations (Yin 2003b: 36).  
4.2.2 External validity 
External validity relates to how generalizable the findings are beyond the chosen case (Skog 
1998: 113). A single case is often criticized for its lack of external validity. Southern Sudan is 
in a very special situation; there is only one other example of secession in post-colonial 
Africa. At first glance there is a very limited transferability of the findings. The advantage 
here is that my case study is one of several related to a larger sovereignty in the making study. 
The same dimensions are being applied to other case studies from the region. This makes it a 
potential cross-case study when aggravated. Cross-case studies are said to be more 
representative of the population of interest than single case studies. However, if the universe 
is limited as in the case of successful secessionist aspirations, few or one case(s) cover big 
parts of the population (Gerring 2007: 43). There are several other less progressed 
secessionist movements in Africa. Findings from the more progressed situation in Southern 
Sudan can hold important learning for other cases. There are also several instances of 
separatist movements and cases of secession worldwide. The findings have the potential to 
contribute to a better understand the concept of sovereignty in the African context. 
4.2.3 Construct validity 
Construct validity concerns correct operational measures for the important concepts of the 
research in question. The central focus is to access ”whether a given indicator is empirically 
associated with other indicators in a way that confirms to theoretical expectations about their 
interrelationship” (Adcock and Collier 2001: 537). A problem occurs if the operationalization 
also covers non-pertinent aspects or unsystematic fallacy (Lund 2002: 120). It is avoided if 
the operational definition covers the relevant theoretical concept. Case studies are often 
criticized for its lack of construct validity because subjective judgment is often used in the 
data collection process and that the operational set of measures are often insufficient (Yin 
2003b: 35). To operationalize sovereignty was a challenge, both because the concept is 
defined in multiple ways, and because the preliminary assumption of this thesis is that 
36 
 
sovereignty might hold other implications in the African context. However, the 
operationalization of the four independent variables are all deeply rooted in existing theory, 
which is important in improving construct validity.  
4.2.4 Reliability 
Validity is dependent on reliability, which concerns the accuracy of the data collection. The 
goal is to reduce errors and biases in the study. If done again, in the same procedure by 
another investigator, will we see the same result (Yin 2003b: 37)? The answer to this question 
in this case is probably not. South Sudan is in a process of constant change. Information is 
limited, can be politically colored, not existent or not always available. The region has been 
prone by civil war for decades that has reduced the possibility to collect and store data. In the 
transition to becoming an independent country, the political situation is tense. Information is 
power; there is not necessarily an incentive for sharing. It is also worth mentioning that there 
have been some evidences of oppression of the media, both from Khartoum and Juba.  
One way to improve reliability in this case is by triangulation of data. I had to gather data 
from different sources. Sources from Sudanese sources, GoSS publications, and statistics had 
to be compared with international press, international organizations, and academic 
publications. The development of the Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and 
Evaluation has greatly improved the access to numeric indicators for Southern Sudan. Yet, the 
first census was highly contested because of the political implication the number of Southern 
Sudanese had in the establishment of the Government of National Unity. However, much 
work has been put in on developing reliable data and I found it to be a good supplement in 
evaluating my variables. In parts of my analysis I had to depend on limited sources. This 
counts especially for section 5.2.3 “The capability to rule through law” and in the assessment 
of the election and referendum. However, the available sources for these sections are 
internationally recognized and unbiased.   
As mentioned earlier, the progress in Southern Sudan cannot be seen in separation from its 
real-life context. Fortunately, I was able to go to Southern Sudan to see for myself. Data 
collection started with a fieldtrip to Juba in March 2011.The trip was highly rewarding in 
contextual understanding and has improved my knowledge of the Southern Sudan. I believe 
that is has made me more able to see discrepancy and inconsistence in contesting sources. 
During my stay I was also able to talk with people that had lived through the conflict, and 
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worked with the development of political institutions. This gave me insight to the ongoing 
process in Southern Sudan. Some informal interviews and conversations where conducted, 
but mainly with non-Sudanese actors, namely NGOs, a representative of the Norwegian 
General Consulate and the UN. One of the most rewarding conversations was with the 
Coordinator for the Norwegian Police force, which gave me great insight to the development 
of security provision in Southern Sudan.  
Getting in to Southern Sudan is a challenge in itself. I owe it to the Norwegian People’s Aid, 
and their good relations with GoSS, that I was allowed to enter Juba in the first place.  
Accessing areas outside Juba are challenging and due to the fact that Juba is not 
representative of Southern Sudan in total, it can give a biased impression of the region. 
Nevertheless, most high-level governmental agencies are situated in Juba. I am certain that 
the visit to Juba has improved the reliability of my thesis. I got access to people and 
documents I would not been able to without the visit. To further improve reliability it will be 
important to clearly state sources and making these people and documents available for other 
researchers on the subject. 
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5 Analysis 
This chapter will build on the theories and empirical considerations presented in the previous 
chapters. The goal is to analyze how sovereignty is crafted in Southern Sudan by looking into 
security provision, administration of justice, revenue capture and political processes. These 
dimensions will be analyzed in the order of appearance above. The four dimensions are all 
somehow related to each other and will in one way or another is over lapping. Take for 
instance security and revenues. Security can be seen as an absolute minimum condition for all 
the other dimensions. However, security has to be financed somehow. There is also a close 
relationship between security and the justice sector, which will become apparent quite early in 
the analysis. Further, as stated by a Norwegian researcher on South Sudan “Maintenance of 
security is perhaps the most important requisite for creating an environment favorable for 
comprehensive governmental structures and social services” (Rolandsen 2005: 133).  
5.1 Security provision 
As mentioned in the part of the theoretical approach, the provision of security to its citizens is 
an all-important function of the state. Even thought the civil war has ended, South Sudan is 
prevailed by insecurity issues and violence. Twenty years of war has led to a highly 
militarized society with little institutional capacity to provide security or tackle local conflicts. 
Nevertheless, some improvements have been made since the signing of the CPA. Yet, before 
we look into what have been done to implement a monopoly on coercion and violence, its 
important to address the challenges towards security provision in the Southern Sudan context. 
5.1.1 Insecurity and violence 
The most obvious threat to security, especially related to sovereignty is the threat of war 
against the North. However, the threat is not the fear of outbreak of full-scale war, rather 
continued clashes between the northern army (or southern tribes or group with support from 
the north) and the SPLA. This has led to a massive build up of forces in the border areas from 
both sides. Consequently, this has increased the insecurity for the people living in the border 
region. It has been reported killings and pillaging which again has led to a flux of refugees to 
neighboring towns and areas. Yet more importantly, this insecurity situation has undermined 
efforts to address internal security threats, which will be the focus of this chapter. 
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There are mainly three factors that contribute to violent internal conflict in Southern Sudan. 
Ethnic divisions are tensions that have been present also during the civil war, as we saw in the 
empirical considerations chapter. Grievances from the war and continued raiding of cattle 
seem to still be fueling conflict. It possible to speculate that Dinka dominance in the political 
system can become a future source of grievance as well. Land and cattle disputes also go back 
in time but these are also exaggerated by returning refugees and lack of resources. The 
growing disaffected youth can be seen as an effect of the long lasting war. There is a large 
population of young men with experience limited to warfare. These circumstances contribute 
to a difficult environment to implement a monopoly on coercion.  
The GoSS has gathered some legitimacy among the population to provision security, as 
proclaimed in the CPA. To analyze the measures taken by the government towards such 
provisions could include several aspects. However, I have chosen to focus on three important 
factors. The provision of security can be measured according to the Government’s ability to: 
1) obtain territorial control and control on the use of violence; 2) their ability to enforce order; 
and 3) their efforts towards disarmament in the population. The first factor is closely 
connected to traditional theories on sovereignty24, yet adjusted to the situation of a nascent 
state. The development of police and justice systems, and disarmament among the population 
together with reintegration of demobilized soldiers where identified as key factors related to 
the development of justice and security institutions in a report on Southern Sudan (Bennett et 
al. 2010). 
5.1.2 Territorial control and control on the use of violence 
Southern Sudan contains a vast territory with limited infrastructure. Paved roads are limited to 
Juba town together with some in relation to the oilfields. During the rainy season many 
provincial areas are only reachable by foot or by helicopter. This makes de facto territorial 
control limited and easily exploited by rebel movements or the Lords Resistance Army. 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
After the CPA, SPLA became the only legitimate military force in Southern Sudan. The Juba 
declaration absorbed many former enemies into one army, but did not make it a unitary actor. 
                                                
24 Weber holds monopoly on violence as a precondition for an entity to be a state. 
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There has been made attempts towards modernizing and professionalize the army, yet is far 
from a completed process. Promotions and top positions have been handed out to control 
opposition or maintain loyalty, which has created a top-heavy overall organization of the 
army. There are huge communication problems and little control over different fractions. 
Local big men or former warlords often have control over local SPLA soldiers and use them 
for their own protection. SPLA leadership is said to de facto control as little as 30 percent of 
its soldiers. Given the capacity problems of the police force, the SPLA is the de facto provider 
of security in Southern Sudan. This might serve as a future problem if the military is to 
enforce law, which should belong to the civil sector/police. However, the SPLA also lacks 
mobility and logistical support. Most of its budget is spent on salaries, fuel and food (Mc 
Evoy and LeBrun 2010: 30-31). After the proclamation of the Republic of South Sudan on 
July 9 2011, the SPLA will become South Sudan National Army (GOSS 2011c). It is likely 
that we will se improvements towards a professionalizing of the new national army, but for 
the time being, the army is unable to provide sufficient territorial control and security. 
Rebel movements 
Central to building up a monopoly on coercion is the constant challenge of dissidents 
launching armed insurrections against the SPLM/A. Intra-Southern armed violence is not a 
new phenomenon, also during the civil war different southern fractions where fighting each 
other. The CPA outlawed all other armed forces than the SPLA to operate in Southern Sudan. 
Other armies had to join the SPLA or return to civilian life (Mc Evoy and LeBrun 2010: 15). 
The Juba declaration of January 2006, was supposed to address this issue and gather the 
different groups under the SPLA umbrella. Reportedly, close to 30 militias had joined the 
SPLA by 2009 (Mc Evoy and LeBrun 2010: 16). However, after the election in 2010 there 
was a new upsurge in dissident rebel insurgents after alleged fraud in the election25.  
One example could be the fraction led by George Athor. As quoted by BBC: “He took up 
arms last year, alleging fraud in state elections, but agreed to a ceasefire last month just before 
the historic referendum” (BBC 2011a). The BBC's reporter further states, “The fighting is 
another sign of the challenges the south faces in bringing its people together and improving 
security” (BBC 2011a). The GoSS are well aware of this problem and has taken measures to 
                                                
25 See IRIN for reported violence (http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=92233) 
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include rebel leaders into the army and even government. However, this might continue to be 
a problem as long as there is mistrust towards the government and weapons available. There 
have also been some allegations that the North is providing these opposition movements with 
arms, to destabilize the South. 
Another security threat in the region is the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Even 
thought they are a movement in opposition towards the Ugandan regime, they have been 
active in Southern Sudan territory since 1988 (Dunn 2007: 134). They attack and terrorize 
villages, they theft ammunition and food, and are also known for abducting children. Joint 
military campaigns between the Ugandan army and SPLA have managed to weaken LRA, but 
not their ability to survive and regroup. It continues to be a serious security threat both in 
Southern Sudan and regionally (Mc Envoy and LeBrun 2010: 27). As long as GoSS is 
unavailable of providing territorial control inside its borders, there is a possibility for the LRA 
to continue its movements in the new South Sudan.  
When the army or police is unable to protect communities they have to rely on protecting 
themselves by arranging local home guards or militias. These home guards are also reportedly 
involved in local conflict with neighboring communities. Armed civilians also blur the 
distinction between civilians and army personnel in Southern Sudan in relation to local 
violence (Rolandsen 2010: 2). Due to the fragile political situation, several people in high-
ranking political and military positions have chosen to keep their own private army, which 
further blur the civilian-military distinction. 
Inter- and intra-communal fighting 
The culturally and ethnically highly fragmented region has been the scene of inter- and intra-
communal fighting for centuries. These conflicts are commonly attached to disagreements 
over land use or raiding of cattle. These conflicts are again aggravated by grievances from the 
civil war. Also military leaders, politicians and intellectuals alike have exploited war-related 
ethnic divisions. There have been little or no efforts towards reconciliation among different 
ethnic groups. The post-conflict political environment can be seen as a fragile balancing act 
between the substantial number of ethnic groups and powerbrokers. Many of the perpetrators 
of war-era violence are today in high-ranking power positions. Former perpetrators of war 
now in political positions have much to win on preserving status quo. They have no incentives 
towards starting a meaningful national reconciliation process when it might lead to the loss of 
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the power positions they have today (Mc Envoy and LeBrun 2010: 9). This can be seen in 
relation to Bayart’s “politique du ventre” and elite accommodation.  
Instances of local violence are both inter- and intra-tribal. For instances, the Murle have been 
clashing with the Lou Nuer, which have also clashed with the Jikany Nuer. Armed tribal 
groups are particularly active in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. The conflicts are often related 
to grievances from the war, but they are now being exacerbated by access to resources, and 
migration conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists. The victims are often children 
and women unable to protect themselves from the well-armed young men. An increased 
number of SPLA soldiers, police and local officials have also been reported killed in these 
attacks (Mc Envoy and LeBrun 2010: 22-23).  
Actors in the international community where worried about how this unstable situation of 
tensions would affect the election of 2010 and the referendum of January 2011. Despite some 
instances of local eruption of violence, both the election and the referendum were completed 
in what observers called fair elections. Southern Sudan managed to perform a democratic 
process even before gaining the status of sovereignty. 
5.1.3 Enforcement of order 
To create law and order there is a need for a functional juridical system capable of 
apprehending and punish criminals. The administration of justice will be further elaborated on 
in part 5.2. This part will be used to address developments related to enforcement of order 
through looking at policing, criminality and informal security. Even thought the Code of 
Criminal Procedure Act was announced in 200926, the police have no practical juridical 
function available to solve local conflicts and often have to rely on local traditions in solving 
such27. The crime rate is reportedly increasing and informal actors play a role in enforcement 
of order. 
                                                
26 Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 2008, (http://www.goss.org/). 
27 Conversation with Strykar Gagnant (March 2011) Community Policing, Norwegian Contingent Commander, UNMIS HQ 
in South Juba. 
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Policing 
Training of a police force has been a part of the CPA, implemented by the United Nation 
Mission In Sudan (UNMIS). According to the mandate “UNMIS Police shall significantly 
facilitate the transformation of Sudan Police into a professional, efficient, community oriented 
police service capable of ensuring safety and security of the common citizen of Sudan” 
(UNMIS Police factsheet 2010). A functioning South Sudan Police Service is very important 
for the security provision of the new country. Both in tackling increased criminality and 
handling local conflicts. Lack of infrastructure and training facilities and equipment are still 
challenges that have to be met (UNMIS Police factsheet 2010). Several reports from local 
papers tell about perpetrators being caught by civilian people, and physically punished before 
handed over to the police. This might be an example of the lack of police resources, but also 
an evidence of the traditional way of taking care of alleged perpetrators.   
As a part of the training an important part is to increase the understanding of the role of the 
police and protection of vulnerable groups. A UNMIS police coordinator told me about how 
the human rights implementation is going28. They where back at a local police station where 
they earlier had taught human rights, only to discover that they had a young boy locked 
behind bars. When asking questions why and underlining that children are not to be arrested, 
the local police explained. The reason they had put the young boy behind bars, was to protect 
the boy from retaliatory means from the father of his best friend that he had accidently killed 
while playing with an old gun. Traditionally, a murder (accidental or not) has to be retaliated. 
This might stand as an evidence of improvements towards raising awareness of protection of 
vulnerable groups and human rights in the local police force. It does not have the potential to 
say anything on general terms, yet is an interesting observation. 
Law enforcement is one of the top priority areas in the GoSS plan for rapid capacity 
development. A key deliverable is to train and deploy 12,000 police to the various states. This 
is seen as feasible by mid-2011 (GOSS 2010b). Training and deployment of more police in all 
regions of South Sudan has the potential to increase law enforcement. 
                                                
28 Conversation with Strykar Gagnant (March 2011) Community Policing, Norwegian Contingent Commander, UNMIS HQ 
in South Juba. 
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Criminality  
War has led to an erosion of traditional authority and practices of customary law that has 
rendered communities unable to control their heavily armed youths (Mc Envoy and LeBrun 
2010: 20). In 2009, there were reports of increasing acts of crime in Southern Sudan. There 
are no complete data available due to lack of internal framework, yet some contributions 
towards collecting numbers are under progress29.  
One factor that has been said to increase criminality is the failing to pay soldiers. As a part of 
the Juba declaration was the promise of regular payment of those who integrated into the 
SPLA army. A large part of the national budget is reserved for the military.  
Actually, a quarter of the budget goes to the SPLA and most of these are for salaries for 
soldiers (BBC 2011b). However, this might not be sufficient to cover all paychecks. Another 
aspect is in what degree these salaries actually end up in the hands of the soldiers. Proving for 
your self with gun in hand might become an option for these unpaid soldiers. A young 
population with a large group of young men with the only training being experience from 
warfare makes it hard to reintegrate ex-combatants into civil society. 
Informal security 
In relation to the increasing crime rate and because of the lack of sufficient police capacity, 
newly established businessmen in Juba town have to rely on private security companies or ex-
soldiers. When walking through the town at night you see men sitting outside every shop with 
firearms. This, however, is an improvement from the period just after the signing of the CPA, 
when most businessmen themselves where carrying guns. Private or informal security 
provision is also substantial in rural areas. During the war the SPLA provided weapons for 
local communities to be able to protect themselves. For instance in the Lakes region 
“gelweng” or cattle guards where armed to protect cattle and communities (Rolandsen 2009: 
8). Another examples can be SPLM home guards created during wartime and so called “arrow 
boys”. These are all consequences of the general lack of protection of local communities by 
the authorities. Given this deficiency in capacity, local authorities often turn a blind eye to or 
even encourage these informal protection forces (Rolandsen 2009: 13).  
                                                
29 Conversation with Strykar Gagnant (March 2011) Community Policing, Norwegian Contingent Commander, UNMIS HQ 
in South Juba. 
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5.1.4 Disarmament and re-integration of ex-soldiers 
Control on violence is close to impossible without control of civilian access to and possession 
of weapons. It can be seen as a threat towards civilian security as well as a potential threat 
towards the government when communities, which do not support the SPLM, have access to 
arms (Rolandsen 2010: 4). There are no reliable figures on the number of arms that circulate 
among the population, however the number is expected to be very high (Rolandsen 2010: 4).  
Flow of small arms 
After decades of war, the Southern Sudanese society is highly militarized. It can be hard to 
differentiate between civilians and military personnel. The “Power of the gun” dynamics is 
still fueling conflict. There have been attempts at disarmament of the civilian population. 
However, this has so far been seen as a failure. Disarming certain group’s only make them 
vulnerable for cattle raids from neighboring communities. Given that the flow of arms is so 
significant, new weapons are regained and used for retaliatory attacks.  
The first attempts towards disarmament, where selectively chosen and solely targeted 
communities that might have held grievances towards the SPLM/A. It was implemented 
without any form of compensation. After the disarmament these communities here left with 
inadequate protection from the police force or the SPLA (Rolandsen 2010: 4). A successful 
disarmament cannot be effective unless the government can provide security to its population. 
This holds both from intra- and inter-communal violence, rebels and the LRA. Little control 
of civilian access to weapons makes it close to impossible for the state to gain a monopoly of 
violence. On the other side, little or no monopoly on violence makes it difficult to disarm the 
population (Rolandsen 2010: 4). 
Reintegration 
The problems related to the large population of heavily armed youths have already been 
mentioned. Not all of these men can be integrated into the army. To control crime rates and 
violence, these men have to be absorbed into civil society. The GoSS have started programs 
for education and training. This makes it able to absorb ex-soldiers into governmental 
institutions, civil services, police, prison, and wildlife services. The Southern Sudan 
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) is the 
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implementing organ for these efforts and was an integral part of the CPA. They work through 
a community-based approach with partners like United Nation Mission In Sudan, 
International Organization for Migration and UNICEF for programs targeting children 
(Southern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission 2011).  
By February 2011, over 8.000 former soldiers were registered into the program and 
approximately 4.700 had completed (Southern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and 
Reintegration Commission 2011). The expected number of ex-soldiers in need of 
reintegration greatly exceeds these numbers and indicates that there is much work left to do. 
However, it can serve as an acknowledgment of the challenge that ex-soldiers pose to civil 
society and a start for a program that could further develop. 
5.1.5 Conclusion 
The preoccupation with the border conflicts has led to a down prioritizing of internal 
insecurity problems. The GoSS and the SPLA might be the legitimate source for the provision 
of security, but they do not hold complete territorial control, neither a monopoly on violence. 
This is first and foremost challenged by rebel movements operating in areas outside control of 
the SPLA, but also by the LRA. Alongside ethnic tensions, this has and will continue to create 
insecurity in the society. Both the GoSS as well as the SPLA are ill equipped to meet the 
challenges of providing security to its people. However, predictions of a referendum 
destroyed by violence and destabilization did not become reality.  
There has been progress in relation to the development of a police capacity. However, there 
are still challenges ahead. In relation to the juridical sector, there is still no throughout 
implementation of the legal framework the police needs to apprehending and punish 
criminals. The traditional way of handling perpetrators still stands strong in many 
communities. This has to be either integrated into the new systems of laws or the capacity of 
the police has to be expanded to be able to solve local conflicts. As a consequence of low 
police capacity (and security provision through the army), many communities organize 
informal security through home guards. When it comes to the immense flow of arms in the 
different communities, the only viable solution is to establish sufficient security provision by 
police and army, before any further disarmament of civilians. One way to reduce the number 
of guns in the hands of civilians is by re-integrating ex-soldiers not just into the army, but also 
into society. When young men become integrated into civil society and are able to provide a 
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livelihood, they become in a lesser degree dependant on the power of the gun. This however 
is not done overnight.  
Security provision is supposedly a prerequisite for sovereignty. The Government of Southern 
Sudan does not have complete territorial control, nor are they able to provide security to all its 
citizens through an efficient police force or a functional juridical system. Nevertheless, there 
have been great improvements in the years following the signing of the CPA.  
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5.2 Administration of justice 
As mentioned in relation to the functions that a state has to hold, administration of justice is 
the second function of state capacity. A state has to administer general justice and provide a 
legal framework to protect citizen’s rights. The progress towards rule of law is significant for 
the development of state capacity. Rule of law will enhance predictability in an unstable 
environment and create legitimacy. Since the signing of the CPA, the GoSS has been able to 
develop a legal system that is codified and publicly known? To investigate the developments 
in administration of justice, I will use three indicators: 1) developments in relation to the 
implementation of a legal system; 2) the capability to rule through law, and to the extent the 
government is seen to do this; and 3) implementations towards the protection of vulnerable 
groups. In order to start investigating this I will briefly go through the legal situation in 
Southern Sudan before the signing of the CPA. The review of progress will mainly be based 
on the 2010 report by United States Institute of Peace called “Local Justice in Southern 
Sudan” (Leonardi et al. 2010). 
5.2.1 The legal situation before 2005 
Because of the lack of hierarchical structures in the south, the British organized the 
administration of the south much later than in the north. Only the Shilluk and the Azande had 
anything resembling the executive hierarchy that the British needed in their commitment to 
work through native structures. The Chief’s courts system that developed in the late 1920s 
was a mixture between British innovation and indigenous customs. The courts set up where 
mobile, handled cattle disputes, and had the power to collect fines and taxes (Johnson 2003: 
12). The 1931 Chief’s Courts Ordinance established a simple hierarchy with: a) courts headed 
by a single chief, and b) courts that was headed by a president but consisted of a panel of 
chiefs (Leonardi et al. 2010: 19). The Sudan Criminal Code and the Sudan Penal Code where 
the main laws governing Sudan during this period. However, the practice was mainly limited 
to the administrative centers. Shari’a acted as a family law in the Muslim population. In the 
rural areas, most societies were following different forms of customary law (Johnson 2003: 
13-14). After the independence, a policy of Islamization of Sudan grew in precedence. By the 
1960s some of the major parties began advocating for an Islamic state. An Islamic state based 
on Shari’a that would deny legal and political rights to non-Muslims (Johnson 2003: 35). The 
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question of an Islamic state became one of the big issues that separated north and south in the 
following wars. 
The areas under SPLM/A administration during the war saw an increasing number of chief 
courts and a new administrative structure. As early as the 1980s, the SPLM/A created its own 
judiciary, with mobile high and appeal courts. Yet, in most cases SPLM/A depended on local 
chief’s courts. In accordance with the establishment of a civil administration on the local 
level, they adopted the new local government terminology of counties, payams and bomas. 
The old local chief courts (headed by one chief or a panel of chiefs) were restructured into 
boma courts and payam courts. The new division did not however follow old boundaries, and 
created some confusion and dispute. This period also experienced a growth in number of 
other courts set up by local authorities, military officers, police government officials and 
committees of traders, which further might have added to the confusion (Leonardi et al. 2010: 
19).  
5.2.2 Implementation of a legal system for Southern Sudan 
Several leading southerners have stated that the SPLA struggle against the north has been a 
struggle to defend the customs, languages, communal properties, traditions and religions of 
the southerners. As southerners reassert an autonomous identity, the preservation of 
customary law, traditional authority and communal land rights is seen as a promising basis for 
a distinct Southern Sudan national identity (Leonardi et al. 2010: 11). The CPA of 2005 
created a semiautonomous government of Southern Sudan. The six year long interim period 
has seen developments towards the creation of the administration of a justice sector.  
 The judiciary is structured into the Supreme Court of South Sudan, Courts of Appeal, High 
Court and County Courts. As an addition other courts and tribunals as deemed necessary can 
be established in accordance with the provision of the Constitution and the law (ICSS: 127 (a-
d)). According to the CPA, The Supreme Court has criminal jurisdiction over the President 
and the Vice-President of the GoSS, and the speaker of Southern Sudan Legislature (CPA 
2005: 35). 
The CPA was incorporated into the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS). This 
Constitution is the supreme law of South Sudan as of 2005. There are also several 
amendments attached to the ICSS. The following amendments have been provisioned to the 
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ICSS: Interpretation of Laws and General provision Act, Code of Evidence Act, Investigation 
Committees Act, Public Premises Eviction Act, Personal Income Tax Act, South Sudan 
Research Council Act, Kush Institutional Act, Juridical Services Act, Judiciary Act, Code of 
Criminal Procedure Act, Partnership Act, Registration of Business Names Act, Ministry of 
Legal Affaires and Constitutional Development Organization Act, Penal Code Act, Child Act, 
Agency Act, Limited Partnership Act, Contract Act and Investment Promotion Act. The most 
important laws in relation to the implementation of a legal system is; the Judiciary Act 
(2008); the Local Government Act (2009); the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure 
(2008); and the Codification of customary law (2008). 
These acts reflect the fact that the Government of Southern Sudan has made attempts towards 
creating a justice system that reflects the values and requirements for justice among its 
citizens. Given both practical and political reasons, the chiefs’ courts and customary law play 
a central role in this endeavor. However, there is still work left in how to define the 
relationship between chief’s courts and the courts of Southern Sudan’s judiciary. The 
different chief’s courts embody ideas about law that does not necessarily reflect the 
governmental judiciary. Neither is the system of chief’s courts always able to ensure equal 
access to justice and the protection of human rights. There are also contradictions and 
uncertainties regarding the jurisdiction and supervision of local courts (Leonardi et al. 2010: 
3). 
The process and culture of dispute resolution can be seen as a step-by-step hierarchy. Most 
disputes originate within close or extended family or communal relations. These conflicts 
should be resolved with assistance from people inside the community before the case is lifted 
to any courtroom. The next level is the boma chief court, which is most often lead by a chief 
or elder in the society. These are often held in open air (under a tree), which enables 
transparency. Most chief’s courts do not follow any written laws or guides, which might 
compromise accountability. The next level is the payam court, which can be described as a 
chief’s court, but closer attached to governmental institutions. The Government Courts are set 
up to handle criminal cases and differs from the other courts with its prominence of papers 
and a more exclusionary architecture. Because they are held inside in small offices, they do 
not have the capacity to include the whole community to watch the case. This might reduce 
accountability and receptivity of the court in the opinion of the audience. Still, many cases are 
handled according to customary law, even though there is a higher prevalence of references to 
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written law. Police play an important role in relation to governmental courts. However, in 
many instances they also cooperate with the chief’s courts. The lack of police capacity, 
especially in rural areas is a problem in enforcing rule of law (Leonardi 2010: 29-37). 
The different communities or ethnic groups practice different forms of customary law. In 
order to create a basis for direct application of a harmonized and modified customary law, the 
different forms needs to be identified and recorded in written form (Leonardi et al. 2010: 3). 
When oral customary law is codified and written down, there will be more certainty in the 
application of law. This kind of work was initiated as early as 1984, with the codification of 
Dinka customary law in the Bahr el Ghazal Province (Leonardi 2010: 27). The strategy for 
Southern Sudan is to develop a codified written customary law based on all ethnic groups, yet 
with community-based definitions and the potential for updating of laws in accordance with a 
changing society (Leonardi et al. 2010: 78). 
5.2.3 The capability to rule through law 
Local perception of the justice system has to be viewed in the light of the greatest obstacles to 
justice and personal security. These are mainly; “the extensive militarization of young men, 
police incompetence or abuses, the power and corruption of the government, and the 
perceived relative erosion of the power of the elders, chiefs, and even judges” (Leonardi et al. 
2010: 39). This might be why people have frequently expressed that a negotiated and flexible 
settlement of the chief’s court is preferable over more rigid application of written laws in the 
Government courts. The main complaint towards courts at all levels, but government courts in 
particular, is the existence of bribery that disadvantages the poor. Despite the perceived 
abuses in the system, there is a general belief that the courts and laws are fair and 
nondiscriminatory (Leonardi et al. 2010: 39).  
Corruption and bribery will happen in all court levels and is exacerbated by the lack of 
payment of officials. However, in chief’s court there is a built-in accountability system. If a 
chief is perceived to be corrupt or ill performing, due to the flexibility of the system a person 
can choose to take its case somewhere else. It is also said that the traditional courts are more 
flexible in negotiating personal relationships, which is useful in a rapidly changing society 
(Leonardi et al. 2010: 34).  
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One of the biggest challenges for the Government in implementing rule of law is the local 
tradition for revenge. “Teeth for tooth” is an inherited tradition in many communities, where 
escalation of violence and revenge killings is the answer if the conflict is not solved 
appropriately. The concept of Dia or blood money is important in this context. It is 
compensation in the case of the loss of life with huge socioeconomic importance for certain 
communities. As early as the 1990s, there were moves towards implementing compensation 
into Southern Sudanese criminal law. These efforts toward compensating the living instead of 
death penalty can be seen as an evidence of integrating customary law into statutory law. The 
increased practice of paying Dia might be seen as a successful example of how GoSS can 
integrate customary law into a written and more accountable system. However, it is worth 
mentioning that this would be less effective if taken out of its original cultural purpose of 
restoring lost reproductive resources (Leonardi et al. 2010: 63-64). 
5.2.4 Protecting vulnerable groups  
Imprisonment is often not enforced if the convict is able to pay compensation or fine. This 
means that prison sentence is most often given to poor people or those without family support 
to pay a fine. Prison is not liked in local culture, where compensation is preferred and prison 
exacerbates breach in social relations (Leonardi et al. 2010: 37-38). This might imply that the 
poor have less protection in this system. 
Traditions frequently give men the upper hand in court cases: They have a potentially closer 
relationship with chiefs and judges. In the marriage system the men are vested rights over 
women. The inheritance system excludes women unless they are widows. Men also 
overwhelmingly dominate the court itself, with few women representatives. There have been 
reports of prison sentence for women seeking divorce, so they would reconsider their demand. 
Nevertheless, its reported that women feel confidence that their case will be handled fairly. 
Complaints are more often criticisms of personal favoritism than biased along gender lines. 
The powerful cultural imperative towards maintaining and restoring social relations often 
accommodate women to express grievances in both public and private arenas. As stated by a 
Parish priest in Wau: “Law is law, whether you are a man or woman” (Leonardi et al. 2010: 
40-41).  
Age might be more of a decisive factor, given the traditional authority of the elders. Young 
people have less of a voice in the courts. Although the Child Act of 2008 grants certain rights 
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for juveniles and children in conflict with the law, little has been done to preserve these rights 
and protections. “Children are often tried as adults and in most detention centers are detained 
together with adults, exposing these children to a heightened risk of sexual abuse” (Human 
Rights Watch 2011: 3). The efforts done by the government and international organizations to 
implement human rights have been met with discontent. It is often seen as a deeply foreign 
imposition, which removes the right for parents and elders to discipline the youth by corporal 
punishment. There are also examples of misinterpretations of human rights in chief’s courts. 
There seems to be a common believe that anyone under the age of eighteen cannot be 
sentenced to prison. This often contributes to courts deliberately records teenagers to be 
eighteen even if they are several years younger. Or, they end up with flogging as punishment 
instead of prison (Leonardi et al. 2010: 58-59). It might also be important to remember that 
age and counting of years does not have the same prevalence as in western societies. Not 
everyone knows their exact age and will not know if they are over or under the legal age of 
eighteen.  
5.2.5 Conclusion 
It seems like the lack of governmental institutions has opened up for a local justice systems 
capable of administrating justice on general basis. However, there are clear indications that 
the traditional system of customary law and the chief’s court is not always able to protect 
vulnerable groups. The implementation of human rights is publicly known yet not understood 
or respected. The same holds for the legal system in total. There is still some confusion about 
where to take your case. And Governmental courts are not always trusted to handle cases in 
the traditional way. However, improvements in codification of customary law, and 
modernization regulated by governmental courts, is likely to improve the administration of 
justice. To a certain degree, there is a clear and understandable legal system in Southern 
Sudan. Yet, it does not belong to the government. Improvements in codification and public 
awareness have the potential to improve the administration of justice and the legitimacy of 
GoSS. 
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5.3 The capture of revenues 
Providing security and government does not come without a price. A common way to pay for 
such expenditures is through revenue capture. Revenue capture is thus a core indicator of state 
capacity. Revenue is defined as a state’s annual income from which public expenses are met 
and capture how the revenues are taken possession of30. Revenues can be collected in different 
ways, but here I will focus on the internal revenue generation. This because of internal 
revenue captures possible sustainability in raising funds. A state’s ability to raise sustainable 
funds is dependent on its ability to implement taxation. Taxation may further create linkages 
between government and society and generate expectations of accountability (Whaites 2008: 
8). Taxation without obvious benefits in terms of productive spending or policy that enables 
public goods for its citizens is likely to generate resentment. 
Domestic revenue capture is highly important for a state in formation in especially two 
concerns. When the state has to work with raising resources, as opposed to rely on a potential 
rents bonanza of oil, the state is more likely to strengthen its structures. Domestic revenues 
also create confidence that the state has financial sustainability, as opposed to depending on 
unstable commodity prices and shifting flows of foreign aid (Whaites 2008: 8).  
The economic paradox referred to as the resource curse, can illustrate the need to avoid oil 
revenue dependence. Several African countries have easily accessible and unexploited oil 
deposits. Nevertheless, countries that depend on such minimally processed natural resources 
tend to have a lower economic growth rate than those without. Oil export tends to inflate the 
value of a country’s currency making other exports uncompetitive. Oil money also has a 
tendency to corrupt politicians. The money ends up in politician’s pockets instead of being 
invested in a country’s long-term prosperity.  However, as Mehlum et al. (2002) points out: It 
is not the abundance of resources itself that creates this economical paradox, rather the 
presence of weak institutions unable to avoid rent seeking.31  
South Sudan was without any formal state structures until the signing of the CPA. The limited 
services that where provided to its population where carried out by rebel organizations, the 
Church, or non-governmental organizations. Bringing in a formal state structure is, as I have 
                                                
30 New Oxford American Dictionary 
31 For a more extensive debate on the resource curse, see Sachs and Warner (1997) and Mehlum et al. (2002) or 
Comparative Political Studies June 2011; 44 (6).  
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already argued, dependant on the establishment of a domestic income base. External support, 
through development aid and capacity building, is still necessary and will be so for a long 
time. But in the long run, the Government of South Sudan’s state capacity will develop more 
sustainable if they can produce internal revenues.32 This section will look into what have been 
done in order to create a framework for such internal revenues. The assessment of revenue 
capture will be based on the governments’ abilities on: 1) creation of an economic 
infrastructure; 2) policy and implementation of personal income tax; and 3) measures taken 
towards taxation of business and tariffs on trade. Before exploring this, there will be a short 
introduction to problems related to oil revenues and a background for taxation in Southern 
Sudan. 
Dependency on oil revenues 
In 2010, the estimated Government of Southern Sudan revenue sources was based on 97.8 % 
oil revenues and only 1.2 % on personal income tax. Other revenue sources like customs, 
VAT and other national revenue counted only 0.4 %, along with other GoSS revenues at a 
marginal 0.6 % (Statistical Yearbook 2010: 154). The peace deal from 2005 equally split the 
oil revenues between the two parties. Even if three-quarters of the daily production of about 
500,000 barrels (which is for example approximately one-fifth of Norwegian production) 
originates from Southern territory, they are dependant on the pipeline and infrastructure 
situated on northern territories (BBC 2011c). The reserves of oil are calculated to be around 
6.4 billion barrels, yet there might be more undiscovered sources and there might not. 
However, indications show that oil revenues are not sufficient to finance expenditures over a 
prolonged perspective. Even today, most of the oil revenues are only used to cover 
governmental and military salaries (Norsk Energi 2011). With relatively weak institutions, 
there is also the potential of developing the economical paradox of the resource curse through 
rent seeking. 
Implementation of taxation 
Taxation is not a new activity even in war-prone Southern Sudan. In times of British rule 
Chiefs courts were set up in Southern Sudan with the main tasks to deal with cattle disputes 
                                                
32 Revenue collection is in the quantitative literature considered a core indicator of state capacity (thus endogeneity issues, 
and potentially mutually reinforcing effects); see e.g. Besley and Perssons works. 
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and collecting fines and taxes (Johnson 2003: 12). During the civil war, local chiefs where 
collecting taxes, often on behalf of SPLA or other movements (Rolandsen 2005: 32). These 
systems however, are not able to provide the government with revenues.  
The administrative structure in Southern Sudan has become quite intricate after the signing of 
the CPA. The old system of three provinces and thirty districts has now been divided into a 
system including the levels of GoSS, state, county, payams and bomas. This extensive sub-
division of administrative units creates a need for a complicated tax system to support the 
government presence and capacity at all levels. The period after the signing of the CPA have 
seen progress towards the creation of a tax system. This is a challenging task for a nascent 
state. Taxation is closely connected to the subject’s recognition of the state’s authority. 
However, coercion can also be taken use of in tax collection. Even if a subject does not 
recognize the legitimacy of the state, the state can coerce taxation, but it might prove to be 
less effective given that the subject might try to avoid the taxation. The current government is 
dominated by Dinka and in some degree the Nuer. The ethnical multitude throughout South 
Sudan might indicate that not all communities see their interests preserved by the government. 
The lack of infrastructure further challenges the possibility of collecting taxes. So does the 
fact that a vast majority of the population are pastoralist or subsistence farmers. As we 
discovered while looking in to security provision, the state also lacks capacity to use coercion 
in the taxation process.  
A tax system is also dependent on a formal economy. Decades of war, and the absence of 
state structures, have fostered systems of trade and economic exchange outside state control 
or money based transactions. Income generated in the informal economy is usually not 
recorded for taxation. Because of low state capacity, many African countries have preferred 
tariffs to income taxes33. Tariffs are easier to collect over taxes, but they do have their 
downsides, as we are about to discover when we look into taxation on business and tariffs. 
Prior to investigating the personal and business taxation process, we will look into what has 
been done in relation to the formal economic sector.  
                                                
33 This has been the case in many African countries, with low state capacity. This is one reason why tariffs have been 
preferred to income taxes, as they are easier to collect. 
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5.3.1 The creation of a formal economic sector  
During wartime formal economic activities where limited. Only a handful banks operated in 
the south and they were all branches of banks based in Northern Sudan. In relation to the 
CPA, the Wealth Sharing Agreement was signed in January. It laid out the groundwork for 
the shape of the banking and currency institutions in post-war Sudan. For the interim period it 
was decided on a dual banking system under the Central bank of Sudan (CBS). The dual 
system was to implement a single monetary policy, following Islamic standards in the north 
and a conventional system in the south. Under the CBS, the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) 
was established to manage the Conventional banking system and to supervise financial 
institutions in Southern Sudan. On 16 July 2011, the newly established Central Bank of South 
Sudan introduced the new South Sudan currency (GOSS 2011a).  
The Ministry of Finance and Economic planning is the implementing organ for the legislation 
and regulation in the economic sector. They are responsible for public financial management 
as well as tax and revenue collection (GOSS 2011b). With international assistance, they are 
currently working on a new financial development plan for the country. 
5.3.2 Personal income tax 
The creation if an independent state demands a formal system of taxation. The 2007 Personal 
Income Tax Act purpose is to provide rules and arrangements for the taxation of income of 
Southern Sudan taxpayers. It is founded upon the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan of 
2005. It grants the GoSS the authority to legislate for collecting the personal income tax in 
Southern Sudan (Personal Income Tax Act 2007 (2009): 4). The act further states that income 
up to 300 SDG34 per month is not object to taxation (0 percent tax), while income over 300 
SDG per month is taxed at 10 percent on the excess over the 300 SDG per month (Personal 
Income Tax Act 2007 (2009):  9).  
However, there are two main problems in relation to this act. First and foremost, there is no 
functioning implementing organ. Collection of taxes is sporadic at best, and non-existing at 
worst. The tax-administrating organ is weak in the sense that they lack trained manpower. The 
whole process is done manually. There is no filing system and tax dues are not formally 
                                                
34 300 SDG equals 112 USD (4 August 2011). 
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notified to taxpayers, this to the simple fact that there is no designed and printed form for 
taxation (Non-oil revenue study 2009).  
The second problem is easily understandable but hard to prove because the lack of economic 
indicators: There are still no income distribution indexes available for South Sudan. However, 
it is quite apparent that there are very few people in South Sudan with a monthly income of 
over 300 SDG. For instance, by looking at the consumption per person per month average 
(urban and rural), it is easily detectable that with an average consumption of 100 SDG the 
now withstanding tax system has a marginal purpose. According to the poverty estimates 
from 2009, 50.6 percent of the population fell below the poverty line. The poverty line was 
calculated to be 72.9 SDG35 per person per month (Poverty in Southern Sudan 2010). 
However, the first pound of public spending on education, health care or infrastructure likely 
has a large positive effect. 
5.3.3 Tax on business and tariffs on trade 
The development of business is still in an early phase following the repercussions of long 
lasting and devastating war. After the signing of the CPA, there has been a rapid development 
of business. According to the Business Survey Listing of 2010, there has been rapid growth 
but mainly concentrated to Juba town (approximately one third of all registered businesses). 
However, 84 percent of registered businesses are in the service sector and big corporations are 
foreign owned (Sandvik 2011).  
The creation of a formal tax system on business is dependent on the government’s ability to 
implement a viable tax law. The existing Registration of business Names Act36 is a step in the 
right direction and made it possible to implement a business survey.  However, there is a need 
to further develop the existing business register and the business certification process. The 
2010 business survey is an important step towards implementing such a system, but because 
of the regulations associated with gathering of statistics, the government will have to collect 
its own data for administrative purpose. 
 
                                                
35 72.9 SDG equals 27.24 USD (4 August 2011). 
36 The Registration of Business Names Act, 2008. Goss.org/Laws, Legislations and Policies 
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Tariffs 
In the commodity sector, there is close to no production or refinement to talk of. Southern 
Sudan is a net importer of products. This can also be seen in relation to how oil-export tend to 
inflate a country’s currency in the resource curse literature. Because Southern Sudan is so 
dependent on import of goods, too much taxation may have quite negative effects, as higher 
prices will reduce demand for import and thus reduce the incentive to transport goods into the 
region. Additionally to the customs in Juba, there are several checkpoints along the road from 
the Kenyan and Ugandan border run by local authorities, police and militias, which demands 
tax on transported goods. Multiple taxes are keeping costs of goods high and contribute to 
maintain Juba’s reputation as Africa’s most expensive capital. Custom tax in itself is 
relatively low (around 10 percent). However, the roadblocks and the unofficial agents raise 
the total tax as high as thirty to forty percent of value. There is also a problem related to 
infrastructure: A system of taxation is possible to implement on larger border crossings, Nile 
ports and airports, but harder at all the other crossings into South Sudan. Despite certain 
progress in registration there where no policy on business taxation present at the date of 
independence. 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
In the beginning of this section I presented several challenges for the GoSS in relation to 
revenue capture. Building government institutions, including taxation system, from the 
ground is not easy under the prevailing conditions in South Sudan. For the nascent state it is 
important to implement viable internal revenue capture apart from oil revenues to develop a 
sustainable state as well as build accountability to its citizens. The GoSS is the legitimate 
actor for revenue capture, yet they are in a very limited degree providing its citizens with 
public goods. It might only be a question of time before that authority will be questioned: The 
present system of tax collection does not function due to lack of implementation of the 
taxation act and insufficient personal income. Related to the business sector, there is still no 
tax policy present. Nevertheless, great progress has been made since the signing of the CPA. 
As early as 2005 Southern Sudan had the financial property of a state with regards to a branch 
of the central bank. However, they were restricted in terms of managing oil resources and 
revenues. The period leading up to independence have seen an improvement in policy and 
awareness of the institutions needed for sovereignty. The management of oil resources and 
60 
 
revenues is now in the hands of GoSS. However, the actual implementation of functioning 
systems is lagging behind. 
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5.4 Political processes and institutions 
We have so far gone through three core functions of the state: security, law and revenue. 
These might be survival functions necessarily in a certain degree. The last function however, 
is not the less important. The performance in all the other functions highly relates to the 
existence of political processes and institutions. This last function of this paper is also highly 
related to the concept of empirical sovereignty and can be seen as an indicator on domestic 
institutional effectiveness. Some degree of action on public expectation is not optional if the 
government wants to uphold its authority (Whaites 2008: 9). In the case of Southern Sudan, 
the authority on providing these core functions is the Government of Southern Sudan. 
As reviewed in the theoretical part, Stein Rokkan presented a framework for state formation 
phases. In very few words the first phase is the consolidation of the political central power or 
institutionalizing and tightening of political rule. His next phase is related to the political 
orders legitimacy, or the ruling systems right to rule. In regards to this I have chosen to 
analyze the fourth dimension in relation to Rokkan’s two initial phases. This section will 
therefore use two indicators: 1) political institutions present in Southern Sudan; and 2) the 
legitimacy of the authorities through the election and referendum processes. The first part will 
handle the background for political institutions, the legislative and executive branch in post-
CPA Southern Sudan37, as well as contesting forms of authority. The second aspect will 
analyze the political processes related to election and referendum, on the assumption that 
these processes express the peoples trust in the ruling systems right to rule. 
5.4.1 Institutionalizing and tightening of political rule 
From the outside and with little knowledge of the new country it might be viewed as a black 
hole of anarchy. This is not the case. As mentioned in the empirical background part, very 
little was present in terms of governing at the time of the CPA signing. Southern Sudan has 
gone from having literary no institutions towards a creation of state structures that actually 
resembles a modern state. Before we move on to exploring the development of political 
institutions and processes, we will start off by a short introduction to progress during the 
second civil war. 
                                                
37 For the Judicial branch, see chapter 5.2 
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Early Political institutions and reforms  
Under influence from Khartoum, institutional arrangements was specifically designed to 
enhance the ability of the north to dominate the south in all domains. The Church and NGOs 
were the only ones providing what could resemble state institutions providing public welfare. 
At the beginning of the second civil war, the SPLM/A was mostly concerned with armed 
resistance. The adaptation of liberation struggle idea led to the development of structures 
inside the movement, towards promotion of participatory democracy, values and ideas of 
tolerance, human rights, rule of law, accountability and transparency. This might have been 
rhetoric’s to begin with, yet, developed into the formation of the National Convention in 1994 
(Rolandsen 2005: 112).  
From 1994 on, The SPLM/A created civil government structures through election of a 
national political body, separation of political and military structures, and a formal judicial 
system. The new political structure of the SPLM/A had the National Convention to meet 
every five years. The National Liberation Council in the function of a legislative and central 
political organ was to meet annually. The Chairman headed the National Executive Council, 
to execute policies and programs for the Movement, together with the responsibility for the 
administration of the “New Sudan”. These institutions were to be replicated at the lower 
levels: region, county, payam and boma.  
SPLM/A and Garang’s reconciliation with Riek Machar in 2002 and Lam Akol in 2003 
strengthened the movement militarily and politically. Ten years of internal civil war between 
the two largest ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer, was ending (Collins 2008:262-263). 
Through regional consultation meetings in 2003, the SPLM/A gathered mandate from (some 
communities of) the people of Southern Sudan to finalize a peace accord with Khartoum 
(Rolandsen 2005: 175). This does not indicate that wartime Southern Sudan had a functioning 
government. Neither did it lead to an immediate change in power structures. Yet, it might 
have laid the groundwork for future developments and the formation of the Government of 
Southern Sudan in 2005 (Rolandsen 2005: 115-116)38. 
                                                
38 For an extensive insight on political development in Southern Sudan during the civil war, see Rolandsen (2005) Guerrilla 
Government. 
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Post-CPA developments  
The CPA clearly provisioned the establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
within the borders of 1 January 1956. The GoSS was to consist of the Legislature of Southern 
Sudan, the Executive of Southern Sudan and the Judiciary of Southern Sudan in accordance 
with a Southern Sudan Constitution (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005: part III, 3). The 
GoSS gained the status of a semi-autonomous government with authority over the states of 
Southern Sudan.  
The Legislature 
The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly came to existence under the Interim Constitution 
of the Southern Sudan of 2005 in accordance with the CPA. Originally it was composed of 70 
percent SPLM members, 15 percent National Congress Party members and 15 percent other 
southern political entities. After the 2010 general election there were only representatives 
elected from constituencies in Southern Sudan left in the Assembly. Except from a few 
representatives of SPLM-DC39 and even fewer Independents, the assembly consisted of SPLM 
party members. The National Assembly of the Republic of South Sudan was established 
through a Presidential Decree on 1 August 2011 (GOSS 2011d). 
The SPLM is the dominant political force in South Sudan. It has transformed itself from a 
rebel movement into the most broadly recognized political entity throughout the south40. Most 
other political parties emerged after the CPA and lack the resources and capacities to form 
any opposition or competition towards the SPLM. 90 percent of the seats in the national 
assembly are held by SPLM together with all cabinet positions – including the presidency 
(International Republican Institute 2011). This non-pluralistic political environment might 
lead to problems in the future. Especially if the SPLM is seen as unrepresentative for the 
ethnically diverse South Sudan population. Opening up political space and improving the 
capacity of contesting parties can solve this. 
                                                
39 SPLM-Democratic Change, a political party headed by Lam Akol. 
40 For more on democratic transition in Africa see e.g. Lise Rakner and related research projects at Christian Michelsen 
Institute. 
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The Executive 
The CPA issued the establishment of an Executive Council of Ministers appointed by the 
President of the Government of Southern Sudan, in consultation with the Vice President and 
approved by the Legislative Assembly in accordance with the constitution. Before the election 
it had the same party allocation as the Legislative Assembly (Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement 2005: 33).  
The leader of SPLM/A, John Garang, became the first President of GoSS and Vice-president 
of Sudan. He was killed in a helicopter crash only three weeks after the finalizing of the CPA. 
The Vice-President of GoSS (and former army chief of SPLA), Salva Kiir, acted as Garang’s 
predecessor and was confirmed as President of GoSS in the April 2010 Presidential election. 
On 9 July 2011, Salva Kiir became the first President of the Republic of South Sudan. Both 
Garang and Salva Kiir are Dinka, but from different groups of the tribe. The Dinka is the 
biggest tribe in South Sudan, but allegations that this tribe overly represents the GoSS has 
lead to antagonism in the multi-ethnic southern population. As already mentioned in relation 
to the Legislative Assembly, SPLM domination might contribute to an unstable political 
environment, if representatives of other groups are not included in the political system.  
However, Salva Kiir’s policies have been more targeted towards building consensus and 
including opposition than the late John Garang.  
Table 1: Presidents of Southern Sudan/South Sudan.  
Presidency tenure Incumbent 
9th July 2005 to 30th July 2005 Dr John Garang de Mabior, President of GoSS 
30th July to 11th August 2005 Salva Kiir Mayardit, acting President of GoSS 
11th August 2005 to date Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of GoSS (President 
of the Republic of South Sudan from 9th July 2011) 
(GOSS 2009) 
When Salva Kiir took over the Presidency, Riek Machar became the Vice-President of GoSS, 
despite his earlier defection from SPLM/A. This political move can be seen as coalition 
building between Dinka and Nuer. Yet also of the prevalence of big men being given 
important positions in the government. Riek Machar is definitely one of the big men from the 
wartime era. Riek Machar joined the SPLM/A in 1984, yet split from the movement in 1991 
and formed the Nasir Faction with Lam Akol. The war between the two factions lead to huge 
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civilian losses and weakened military opposition against the north. The Nasir Faction signed a 
separate peace deal with Khartoum, received military assistance in fighting the SPLM/A. 
Salva Kiir was named President of the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council and assistant to 
the President of the Republic of Sudan. However, because of broken promises from the 
Khartoum government, he went back to the bush in January 2000. During this period Machar 
controlled a big part of the Nuer army, together with several regions and the flow of aid going 
in to these regions. He rejoined SPLM/A in 2002 yet did not get the position as vice-president 
until after the death of Garang in 2005 (Breidlid 2010: 288-296). Including Machar into the 
Government can be viewed as building consensus in the population with admitting opposition 
into power positions. However, it might also be viewed in terms of Reno’s elite 
accommodation. Machar’s access to a political position is an opportunity for him to enable 
personal gains for himself. It might also be seen as an advantage for GoSS, were including 
Machar increases outwards appearance of control over people and territory (Reno 1998: 2). 
Table 2: Vice-Presidents of Southern Sudan/South Sudan. 
Vice-Presidency tenure Incumbent 
9th July 2005 to 11th August 2005 Salva Kiir Mayardit, Vice President of GoSS 
11th August 2005 to date Dr Riek Machar Teny, Vice President of GoSS 
(Vice-President of the Republic of South Sudan 
from 9th July 2011) 
(GOSS 2009) 
Among several other duties and tasks, the President is responsible for the creation, 
reorganization and disbandment of ministries, commissions and other administrative units of 
the GoSS. He also appoints ministers, chairpersons of commissions and heads of other 
administrative units and their senior-most public servants. Several of the ministers are former 
army commanders of the SPLA. Most hold degrees from higher education achieved in 
Khartoum or abroad. By the time of the secession the GoSS consisted of the following thirty-
one ministries:  
Table 3: The Government of South Sudan Ministries. 
Office of the President Water Resources and Irrigation  
Cabinet Affairs Housing and Physical Planning 
SPLA and Veteran Affairs  Education 
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Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development Health 
Regional Cooperation  Information 
 Internal Affairs Communications and Postal Services 
Labour and Public Service Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs  
Parliamentary Affairs Culture and Heritage 
Finance and Economic Planning Investment 
Roads and Transport  Human Resource Development 
Agriculture and Forestry   Environment 
Animal Resource and Fisheries Higher Education, Science and Technology 
Cooperatives and Rural Development Youth, Sports and Recreation 
Energy and Mining Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management 
Commerce and Industry  Peace and CPA Implementation Affairs 
Wildlife Conservation and Tourism  
(GOSS 2011d) 
From the CPA period, the GoSS now have a full complement of ministries and commissions 
to tackle the development challenges of South Sudan. However, legislative oversight of the 
institutions is still relatively weak. This is mainly a consequence of delays in passing 
legislation. In addition, there have been delays in strengthening parliament and other parts of 
the law-making system. Senior level staffing of institutions is still uncompleted. There is also 
a huge deficit in capacity both at government and state level, which replicates downwards at 
lower governing levels (GOSS 2008: 4).  
State and local institutions 
The CPA also provided Southern Sudan with a framework for institutions at the State level. 
The institutions on the state level are replications of the institutions on GoSS level; only the 
state executive is the office of the Governor (CPA 2005: 36). All ten states have their own 
legislative, executive and judiciary. As already mentioned there are some positions to be filled 
and capacity problems left unsolved. One of the priority areas for executive leadership is to 
ensure coordinated messaging within the GoSS and the state level (GOSS 2010b: 1).   
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Under the level of state, there is the further division into county, payam and boma. Given the 
size of Southern Sudan, limited infrastructure and limited broadcasting, traditional authority 
continues to play an important role in everyday life. The majority of the rural population is 
depending on the Chief for providing livelihood and wellbeing. There has been little 
improvement in Government provision of social services. Even if prioritized by the 
government, there is still a problem in filling vacancies to create capacity at boma, payam and 
county level. As mentioned in relation to the administration of justice, the lack of 
governmental institutions preserves traditional authority’s role in the communities. This 
influences the Governments ability to build legitimacy. Yet, it might be improved both by 
providing services for communities, and by integrating traditional authorities into political 
structures, as done in the administration of justice sector.    
Related to the problems of providing security, there are still areas and villages that are 
controlled by local militias or big men. It is hard to find written evidence of how big men or 
militias challenge the authority of the government. In Unity state, Peter Gadet from a Nuer 
tribe is leading a rebel group called South Sudan Liberation Army. In an interview he says 
they are: “fighting corruption, lack of development, and the domination of the Dinka ethnic 
group” (BBC 2011b). It might be a legitimate expression of the neglect of some communities 
by the GoSS, but just as well be related to the issue that some big men like Peter Gadet are 
being excluded from political power in the new government.  
5.4.2 Legitimacy through election and Referendum? 
Legitimacy can be viewed as the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain the 
belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society41. The 
shortage in providing public goods to its citizens might become a challenge towards the 
Government of South Sudan’s authority. However, it is important to remember that Southern 
Sudan was without any form of governmental institutions for decades and that it has only 
been six years since the signing of the CPA. Developments in election processes can also be 
used in analyzing the popular legitimacy of the authority GoSS.  
                                                
41 From Seymore Martin Lipset’s classical study Political Man (1960). 
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2010 Election 
Due to delays in the implementation, the first multi-party election in Sudan in 24 years was 
delayed by a year. Originally it was supposed to be held in July 2009, but was moved to April 
2010. The election was actually six elections held simultaneously, to fill the following offices: 
President of the Republic of Sudan, President of the Government of Southern Sudan, 
Governors for the twenty-five states, members of the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), 
members of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), and members of the State 
Legislative Assembly (SLA). However, Southern Sudanese had to fill twelve ballots in total. 
This is because of a rather complicated system were the presidential seats are elected through 
an absolute majority system. State governors and 60 percent of NLA, SLA and SSLA are 
elected through a simple majority system in single member constituencies. The remaining 40 
percent of NLA, SLA and SSLA are elected in closed party lists (15 percent) and women’s 
lists (25 percent) in a system of proportional representation with a 4 percent threshold 
(European Union Election Observation Mission 2010: 17-18). 
The legal framework for the conduct of elections where in accordance with international 
standards, apart from the limitations posed by national criminal and national security laws. 
These laws reduced rights to express opinion and campaigning. In the south the election was 
conducted in an uncontrolled environment that led to confusion, clashes and intimidation. 
There were delays in publication of lists, ballots only written in Arabic, little available 
information, criticism towards voter registration, and refused voters. The election were 
followed with complaints of fraud and rigged election. There were also complaints of biased 
media coverage. The outcome of the election, however, was relatively clear. In the legislative 
assemblies, there was an overwhelming vote for the two governing parties, National Congress 
Party in the north and SPLM in the south. Omar Al-Bashir won 68.2 percent of the votes for 
President of the Republic of Sudan. Salva Kiir won the President of the GoSS office by 92.9 
percent (European Union Election Observation Mission 2010: 6).  
The Carter Center, the European Union and countries and bodies that sponsored the CPA, 
where all invited to take part in the process. Some provided training of staff and some were 
present as observers and implementers of the election (Barsaba 2010). In the Carter Center’s 
final report on the election they had the following assessment of the election: circumscribed 
political rights and freedoms had placed limits on political parties and civil society which 
fostered distrust between ruling parties and opposition in both the northern and southern 
69 
 
region. This reportedly undermined the inclusiveness and credibility of the election (Carter 
Center 2010). 
A report from the Southern Sudan High Election Committee complements the process, yet 
describes some difficulties related to the election: The LRA and tribal unrest in Jonglei, 
Upper Nile Unity and Warrap states, created insecurity in certain areas. The election was 
highly complicated with twelve different votes in the same election for first-time voters or 
voters that had not voted in twenty-four years. The high illiteracy rate, especially among rural 
women, posed a challenge especially given that ballots were only written in Arabic. There 
were also financial constraints and lack of basic infrastructure (Barsaba 2010).  
Despite allegations of fraud and all the problems related to the elections, it was seen as a 
relative success in the southern population. The south now had a legitimately elected 
government and president. Even if the result was somehow contested it was seen as progress 
towards the 2011 Referendum that would decide the future of the southern population 
(European Union Election Observation Mission 2010: 4-6). It might be added that there is a 
possibility that most people of the south did not see the value of the actual election. Thus, the 
result might not be taken as legitimizing the GoSS in people’s opinion. The function of the 
election might rather be viewed as a preparation for the Referendum.  
2011 Referendum 
The implementation of the Southern Sudan Referendum fulfilled a major requirement of the 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In the period after the signing of the CPA, no one 
was sure whether the Referendum would ever take place. Nevertheless, the Referendum took 
place on time and under a peaceful and orderly environment. In the aftermath it can definitely 
be viewed as a remarkable operational and political achievement. This despite some delays in 
passing the Southern Sudan Referendum Act, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 
(SSRC) and the establishment of the Juba based Southern Sudan Referendum Bureau (SSRB). 
Domestic as well as international observers reported a free fair and credible process, which 
reflected the desire of the Southern Sudanese voters for secession (European Union Election 
Observation Mission 2011: 5).  
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There are mainly four shortcomings that should be mentioned in relation to this process. The 
referendum took place in a non-pluralistic political environment42 with instances of 
intimidation tactics by the ruling SPLM. This consisted mostly of encouraging registered 
voters to cast their ballot. In ten percent of the Referendum Centers the turnout was in excess 
of 100 percent43. This excess was not investigated by the SSRB before the results where 
published. In relation to the legal aspect, some elements of the Referendum’s legal framework 
were bypassed to allow the Referendum to take place by the deadline. There were also a lack 
of appeal mechanisms to allow natural or legal persons to challenge elements of the 
Referendum administrating bodies in the preparation and execution of the Referendum 
(European Union Election Observation Mission 2011: 5-6).  
The registration process was effective and according to procedures. The number of registered 
voters was 80 percent of the number that registered for the 2010 election. Close to 86 percent 
of the estimated number of eligible voters registered for Referendum. The voter turnout was 
extremely high. Estimates show that the total population of Southern Sudan was between 8 
and 9 billions in 2010, with approximately 54 percent of the population being under the age of 
nineteen44. The number of registrants was 3,947,676, out of where 3,851,994 voters cast their 
ballot45 (European Union Election Observation Mission 2011: 8).  
The referendum ballot was printed in both Arabic, English and accommodated illiterate 
voters. South Sudan has a high illiteracy rate, especially among women. To cast your vote, 
you only had to put your fingerprint on one of the two illustrated options. This was an 
improvement from the 2010 election, when ballots were only printed Arabic.  
                                                
42 The participation of other parties was limited. 
43 Turnout over 100 percent is probably the outcome of increased population and returning Southern Sudanese since the 
Population and Housing Census in 2008. 
44 Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010 
45 Suffrage in Southern Sudan is eighteen years of age 
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Figure 2: Example of illustrations on ballot paper. 
 
(Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 2011) 
Very few women were working as staff at the Referendum Centers. This was partly due to the 
forty years of age limit imposed upon all Referendum Center staff members. The younger 
generation of women that had benefitted from the improved access to education was excluded 
on the basis of this age limit, together with adherence to local cultural and religious codes. 
However, approximately 52 percent of registered voters were women (European Union 
Election Observation Mission 2011: 36).   
Southern Sudan civil society played an important role in the process. Civil society 
organizations were providing voter and civic education as well as domestic observers. Media 
outlets in Southern Sudan is limited in capacity and distribution, yet was not particularly 
affected by tight control by GoSS. Both state owned and private radio and TV media allocated 
far more airtime on advocating separation. The printed press however, was less biased and 
some even allocated marginally more space for unity advocacy (European Union Election 
Observation Mission 2011: 45-46). 
The results from the referendum were overwhelmingly in favor of separation. Only 1.17 
percent voted for unity, and 98.83 percent for secession (Southern Sudan Referendum 
Commission 2011). The Carter Center, an American organization with observers following 
the whole process, stated: “the referendum process to date is broadly consistent with 
international standards for democratic elections and represents the genuine expression of the 
will of the electorate” (The Carter Center 2011). The Referendum was a choice between 
continued unity and separation. The overwhelming vote for separation is first and foremost a 
token of the southern populations desire for separation. Thus, it can also be seen as the 
southern population acceptance of GoSS to conduct South Sudan. 
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5.4.3 Conclusion 
In the six years since the signing of the CPA, the “Guerrilla government” of SPLM/A has 
evolved into what resembles a government with political institutions and processes. However, 
traditional authority still play’s an important role in the communities. Lack of security 
provision and public goods enables local militias to undermine the government’s authority. 
The existence of political institutions can also be said to mimic a western pattern. The 
political institutions are present, yet they does not manage to fully implement policy.  
The Government of Southern Sudan (with a little help from its friends) managed to hold a 
general election, with an acceptable if not completely acknowledged outcome. This process 
prepared Southern Sudan to hold a free and fair Referendum with the result of becoming an 
independent state. The developments in the general election and the Referendum points 
towards that the GoSS is recognized as the most appropriate authority for the society. In 
relation to Rokkan’s phases, the GoSS has been able to initiate political coordination, increase 
centralization and expand public authority. Elections and Referendum has confirmed the 
ruling systems right to rule. After the referendum South Sudan has also received recognition 
of sovereignty from the United Nations and the African Union. 
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6 Conclusion 
The developments in Southern Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), has showed that it is possible to go from complete lack of state institutions 
to a sovereign government with structures resembling a modern state. South Sudan declared 
its independence 9 July 2011, which made it the most progressed current “sovereignty in the 
making” project in Africa.  
After the signing of the CPA, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), mainly consistent 
of members of the SPLM/A, became the legitimate semi-autonomous authority for Southern 
Sudan. Due to decades of war and mismanagement from the regime in Khartoum, GoSS had 
to build state structures from the ground. Even if they have been unable to establish complete 
territorial integrity and control of violence, they have been able to decrease insecurity through 
the formation of a professionalized army and police force. In the administration of justice, 
there is a relatively clear and understandable legal system present even if its legitimacy lays 
somewhere between governmental and traditional authority. The financial institutions needed 
for sovereignty is present in South Sudan. The same stands for a framework for sustainable 
revenue capture, even if implementation is less progressed. South Sudan has a president, vice-
president and a legislative assembly elected by popular vote and a set of ministries. And, the 
people of Southern Sudan voted with overwhelming participation and vote for separation in 
the 2011 Referendum, which can be seen as the people’s acceptance of the GoSS as its 
legitimate authority.   
Even if the GoSS has not fulfilled all functions of sovereignty, they have managed to achieve 
sovereignty in terms of recognition from external actors. In this view it is possible to state that 
the developments undertaken in the four dimensions as sufficient for gaining sovereignty. In 
light of the analysis presented in the previous chapters, its time to get back to the initial 
research question: How is sovereignty crafted in Southern Sudan? And, what are the 
challenges in the four dimensions of sovereignty in the making? 
6.1 How is sovereignty crafted in Southern Sudan? 
I set out to understand the core aspiration of this thesis – sovereignty in the making.  My 
interest was triggered by the possibility that Southern Sudan could become the newest 
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addition to the states of the world, emerging from close to a total lack of state structures and 
decades of internal strife and civil war. To test how sovereignty is crafted in Southern Sudan I 
have carried out an explorative case study on the Government of Southern Sudan’s 
achievements since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. 
Aware of the problem of transferability, I established certain aspects from existing theory that 
made a useful contribution to developing a set of dimension. Developments in the provision 
of security, administration of justice, revenue captures and political processes and institutions 
are seen as fundamental functions towards ensuring legitimacy and authority for a nascent 
state. To measure these dimensions they were further operationalized into underlying 
measurable indicators, adjusted to the political reality in Southern Sudan.  
My assumption in the introduction chapter was that I would find very few indications of these 
dimensions being in place before independence. I predicted however, that I would find 
instances of work in progress. The dimensions chosen for this paper proved useful to cover  
the Government of Southern Sudan’s achievements in crafting sovereignty, yet also to 
uncover challenges ahead. Given the flexible nature the analytic framework presented, it 
made it possible to view the progress in South Sudan as a real attempt on sovereignty in the 
making. It is also worth mentioning that the present institutions and laws, even if not 
completed, may serve as driving force and builders of accountability, which in the future 
enables more progress in the four functions.  
The main findings in my analysis is the prevalence of measures taken in the four dimensions.  
Especially the many laws and political institutions present that resembles the ones you could 
find in a western country. State formation in Southern Sudan seems to be mimicking many 
aspects of the formation of western states. Institutions and processes are there, yet it seems 
less effective when it comes to implementation. This mimicking of western institutions might 
be a consequence of huge international investment in the process, were a centralized western 
model seems to be preferred by the international society. Yet, as we have seen South Sudan 
has elements that do not fit directly in to this model, especially in relation to traditional values 
and authorities.  
I found that the Government of Southern Sudan has been relatively successful in most of the 
dimensions. Especially when you consider the short time since the peace agreement. 
However, I acknowledge that a great amount is lacking. This must, however, be seen in 
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relation to the amount of time given the government for developing the relevant institutions. 
Western European states had centuries to develop what the GoSS is expected to deliver in just 
six years. I will conclude this part with some general problems that can be connected to 
shortcomings in the theoretical and analytic framework that will be further explored in the 
next section. 
Even if important institutions, laws and systems are in place, there is a huge gap between 
what is on paper and what is functioning effectively. A possible reason why it has been so 
hard to implement the framework of these new institutions might be because the new political 
system, processes and laws does not correspond with traditions and values within South 
Sudan’s population. Most of the new developments are blueprints of the western state. They 
look good on paper, but are not necessarily transferable into the empirical reality in South 
Sudan. One example is the taxation process. There are laws and institutions present, but very 
limited collection of taxes implemented. Another is alternative form of security provision. 
This takes us back to the problem of transferability. Models and theories for the state are 
constructed in the western European context, and are not necessarily directly transferable to 
the African reality. 
A centralized western model does not emphasize the importance of implementing existing 
traditional authorities into the formal state. This might lead to erosion instead of strengthening 
of traditional authorities. Implementing traditional values and authorities might have the 
potential to strengthen the legitimacy of the government’s authority if modernized and 
adjusted into formal structures. As we saw in the case of the administration of justice, 
people’s trust in government can be increased when traditional authorities and traditions are 
implemented into the formal system. This might serve as an example for improving 
developments in other functions as well.  
Sovereignty in the making in South Sudan is not dependent on the completion of fulfilling 
demands in all the four dimensions presented. Authority and political power in South Sudan 
can to a certain degree be seen as extended in fading circles (Clapham 2004). The further 
away from the political center, Juba, the less control over the analyzed dimensions. Lower 
degree of security provision decrease governmental controlled justice, revenue capture and 
political institutions. This implicates the interconnectedness of the four functions in relation to 
emerging forms of state formation in Africa. Yet it is also underlining the reason why 
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alternative forms of providing security, justice, public services and authorities still play an 
important role in South Sudan communities. 
One crucial but often overlooked component needed for nascent states is a national identity as 
a part of an overall strategy for development. This is very likely to be the case in South 
Sudan. The importance of a clearly and accurately defined national identity could strengthen 
the foundation of a nation that further would enable successful and lasting founding 
documents, social and political structures and societal cohesion (Townsend 2011). The lack of 
a South Sudanese national identity might become a challenge for the authorities in South 
Sudan. When the common threat from the north vanish, the need for a defined national 
identity will appear. There have been some attempts towards creating a national identity as 
seen in the administration of justice sector. The codification of a unified customary law have 
the potential to strengthen a South Sudanese identity under a collective framework of laws. 
Another example is the process leading up to the new national anthem. A competition was 
launched for the people of South Sudan to compose the new anthem were everyone was 
invited to take part in the process. The national identity aspect however, takes us back to the 
nation building versus state building categorizing. For long term development there might be 
a need to open up for a concept more according to nation building in the international 
society’s approach towards nascent states. 
6.2 Theoretical reflections 
Despite the problem of transferability, I was able to extract aspects of existing theory based 
on the western European state that proved to be applicable as analytic tools. Stein Rokkan’s 
state formation phase proved to be a useful in relation to understanding how sovereignty is 
crafted in South Sudan. This, by viewing it as a phase or process were several characteristics 
together lead towards institutionalizing and tightening of political rule. Rokkan’s second 
phase proved to some limited extent applicable in the case of South Sudan. Through the 
process of the election and referendum, the GoSS has been able to establish legitimacy. The 
foundation of the political orders legitimacy is an important component of Rokkan’a second 
phase. However, Rokkan is not directly transferable, mainly because the context he portrays 
the state is very different from the reality in South Sudan. 
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Existing theories are useful but not sufficient to explain sovereignty in the making in Africa. 
The problem of transferability is highly relevant. The African state is not the same as the 
western European state. The definition of the modern state and sovereignty exclude certain 
important aspects in relation to the sovereignty in the making project. Even though western 
society assumes that replicating the western state is the best way to develop nascent states, 
there might be other forms of order and political structures more suitable for African states. 
As we discovered in the case of South Sudan there are informal structures that function 
adjacent to the formal institutions. The western model does not enable to capture traditional 
patterns of authority like chief’s courts and other inherited values.  
As we have discovered, South Sudan have structures that resembles the modern state. At the 
same time it is not functioning effectively according to western standards elevated in 
traditional theories on the state. African states are hybrids, with some dysfunctional aspects 
but also parts that resemble institutional apparatus operating by Weberian norms (Englebert 
2009: 8). This is also the case for South Sudan. Consequently, I will argue that the theories 
need to be transformed to better suite the African context. The demands for effectiveness are 
too high and the models too rigid.   
Clapham’s approach to sovereignty in the sub-Saharan context deserves to be revisited. I find 
it useful to view crafting of sovereignty in South Sudan as a entity that meet criteria’s of 
sovereignty to a lesser or greater extent. In the analysis of the dimensions or criteria’s of 
statehood and sovereignty, the case study on South Sudan has showed exactly this. Criteria’s 
are neither fulfilled nor absent even if the Republic of South Sudan is now a sovereign state. 
In what Clapham calls the decline of quasi-statehood, he argues that juridical sovereignty is 
only a temporary device for new states. At some point their inadequacies will be revealed and 
to proper claim sovereignty the new state will have to develop effective institutions (Clapham 
1998: 146). In South Sudan, the potential of becoming an internationally recognized state 
might have served as a driving force for developments in the four dimensions. At the same 
time, South Sudan made big improvements in the four dimensions even before international 
recognized sovereignty was proclaimed. This underlines that sovereignty is better viewed as a 
process rather than as eliminating categories of juridical and empirical sovereignty. In South 
Sudan the possibility to become a sovereign state might have served to improve domestic 
institutions. On the other side, the improvements in domestic institutions might have served as 
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a driving force for international recognition. Therefore, sovereignty in the making, in the case 
of South Sudan, is best categorized as a process not a particular condition. 
6.3 Future research 
This thesis focused exclusively on sovereignty in the making in South Sudan. However, 
because states and borders in Africa are remains of colonial rule, it is not unlikely that we will 
see more attempt on secessions and new sovereignty in the making projects. South Sudan and 
SPLM/A might also serve as an example for other movements seeking political control. To 
better understand the phenomenon of sovereignty in the making, similar studies could be 
applied to other cases.   
This particular thesis was done in a macro perspective. Several aspects was touched upon 
without the possibility to be fully explored. Therefore, I see a need for a more focused study 
on each of the dimensions. I could also be interesting to apply Rokkan’s phases on other 
similar cases to further test the relevance of Rokkan in state formation today. My thesis 
further located the need to investigate traditional authorities and values role in state formation 
in Africa.  
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